GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC

8/12/2005 10:48 AM

Duke Law Journal
VOLUME 54

DECEMBER 2004

NUMBER 3

HOW TO INFLUENCE STATES:
SOCIALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
RYAN GOODMAN†
DEREK JINKS††
ABSTRACT
Regime design choices in international law turn on empirical
claims about how states behave and under what conditions
their behavior changes. Substantial empirical evidence suggests

Copyright © 2004 by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks.
† J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and
Comparative Law, Harvard Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. (Sociology), Yale
University.
†† Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law; Assistant
Professor of Law Designate, University of Texas School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School;
M.Phil. (Sociology), Yale University. This article benefited significantly from presentations at
the UCLA School of Law Politics and International Law Colloquium, the University of
Chicago International Law Workshop, the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop, the
University of Michigan Law School International Law Workshop, the Stanford/Yale
Junior Faculty Forum, the University of Texas Faculty Workshop, and the Yale Law School
Human Rights Workshop. We owe special thanks to William Alford, José Alvarez, David
Barron, Mitch Berman, Bernard Black, Donald Braman, Jane Cohen, Einer Elhauge, Karen
Engle, Terry Fisher, Heather Gerken, Jack Goldsmith, Andrew Guzman, Laurence Helfer,
Christine Jolls, Paul Kahn, Jerry Kang, David Kennedy, Harold Hongju Koh, Barbara
Koremenos, Daryl Levinson, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, Eric Posner, Todd Rakoff,
Steven Ratner, Kal Raustiala, Larry Sager, Reva Siegel, Steven Shavell, David Sloss, Duncan
Snidal, Richard Steinberg, William Stuntz, Guhan Subramanian, Alexander Wendt, John Yoo,
and Jonathan Zittrain. For excellent research assistance, we thank Naomi Loewith and
Hengameh Saberi.

GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC

622

8/12/2005 10:48 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:621

three distinct mechanisms whereby states and institutions
might influence the behavior of other states: coercion,
persuasion, and acculturation. Several structural impediments
preclude effective implementation of coercion- and persuasionbased regimes in human rights law—yet these models of social
influence inexplicably predominate in international legal
studies. In this Article, we first describe in some
detail the salient conceptual features of each mechanism of
social influence. We then link each of the identified
mechanisms to specific regime design characteristics—
identifying several ways in which acculturation might
occasion a rethinking of fundamental regime design problems
in human rights law. Through a systematic evaluation of three
design problems—conditional membership, precision of
obligations, and enforcement methods—we elaborate
an alternative way to conceive of regime design. We
maintain that (1) acculturation is a conceptually distinct social
process through which state behavior is influenced; and
(2) the regime design recommendations issuing from this
approach defy conventional wisdom in international
human rights scholarship. This exercise not only recommends
reexamination of policy debates in human rights law, it
also provides a conceptual framework within which the
costs and benefits of various design principles might be
assessed. Our aim is to improve the understanding of how
norms operate in international society with a view to improving
the capacity of legal institutions to promote respect for
human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
International regime design questions are essentially empirical in
nature.1 Addressing them requires nothing short of understanding the
social forces that shape the behavior of states—whether rewards and
penalties, reasoned arguments, or concerns about status might
influence recalcitrant states (and individuals). In this Article, we
identify three specific mechanisms for influencing state practice:
coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. We also describe the distinct,
and sometimes competing, logic of each mechanism. Optimal regime
design, we contend, is impossible without identifying and analytically
foregrounding the mechanisms of influence and their discrete
characteristics. We consider in detail how these mechanisms of social
influence might occasion a rethinking of fundamental regime design
issues in international human rights law.
The increasing exchange between international relations
scholarship and international legal scholarship illuminates some of
the difficulties involved in regime design and offers useful insights to

1. Drawing on international relations literature, we use the concept of “regime” to refer
to the formal and informal aspects of a regulatory environment. See Stephen D. Krasner,
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (“Regimes can be defined as
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”).
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2
resolve them. Much current international relations research focuses
on theoretical and empirical issues concerning human rights and state
3
practice. This work has inspired legal analyses of international
human rights regimes. This groundbreaking “first generation” of
empirical international legal studies demonstrates that international
law “matters.”4 Nevertheless, the existing literature does not
adequately account for the regime design implications of this
research. Regime design debates often turn on unexamined or
undefended empirical assumptions about foundational matters such
as the conditions under which external pressure can influence state
behavior, which social or political forces are potentially effective, and
the relationship between state preferences and material and
ideational structure at the global level. Moreover, prevailing
approaches to these problems are predicated on a thin and
underspecified conception of the mechanisms for influencing state
practice.5 What is needed is a “second generation” of empirical
international legal studies aimed at clarifying the mechanics of law’s
influence. This second generation, in our view, should generate
concrete, empirically falsifiable propositions about the role of law in
state preference formation and transformation.

2. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International
Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter
Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International
Relations, 285 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (2000).
3. See Hans Peter Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 517 (offering a survey of the
existing literature).
4. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1835 (2002); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 337–66 (1997); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book
review). We have previously taken a first generation approach in analyzing aspects of human
rights law. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties,
14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173–78 (2003).
5. This is a widely recognized deficiency of constructivist scholarship in international
relations. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,
50 WORLD POL. 324, 325 (1998) (“[C]onstructivism, while good at the macrofoundations of
behavior and identity (norms, social context), is very weak on the microlevel. It fails to explore
systematically how norms connect with agents.”); Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International
Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 487, 488 (2001) (observing that
constructivists “have not been very successful in explaining the microprocesses about how
precisely actors are exposed to, receive, process, and then act upon the normative arguments
that predominate in particular social environments, such as international institutions”).
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First-generation scholarship in international human rights law
provides an indispensable but plainly incomplete framework.
Prevailing approaches suggest that law changes human
rights practices by either (1) coercing states (and individuals) to
6
comply with regime rules, or (2) persuading states (and individuals)
7
of the validity and legitimacy of human rights law. In our view, the
former approach fails to grasp the complexity of the social
environment within which states act, and the latter fails to account
for many ways in which the diffusion of social and legal norms
occurs. Indeed, a robust cluster of empirical studies in
interdisciplinary scholarship documents particular processes that

6. An important strand of international legal scholarship accordingly adheres to the
coercion model. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 970 (2000) (book review); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric
A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115, S124 (2002) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Moral and Legal
Rhetoric]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Customary International
Law]; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1865–68 (2002); Hathaway, supra note 4, at 2020.
7. The persuasion model is also widely endorsed in legal scholarship. See, e.g., THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 8 (1995) [hereinafter
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 183–94 (1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, LEGITIMACY]; Sarah H.
Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2001);
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 278; Koh, supra note 4, at 2603. Dean Anne-Marie
Slaughter’s influential work on transgovernmental networks also relies principally on notions of
persuasion. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government
Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 205 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (describing
transgovernmental networks in which “[t]he dominant currency is engagement and
persuasion”); see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 51 (2002)
(“[W]hen networks promote regulatory change, change occurs more through persuasion than
command.”). Dean Slaughter and Professor Raustiala’s work derives, in significant part, from
the school of “managerialism” pioneered by Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes. Professors
Chayes and Chayes’s project understands persuasion as central. See ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining
compliance with treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the
parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public.”); id. at 26 (“Persuasion and argument are
the principal engines of this process . . . .”). Dean Koh’s work derives more directly from
political science scholarship concerning transnational advocacy networks. See, e.g., Koh, supra
note 4, at 2645–59. As Professor Rodger Payne’s survey of that scholarship explains,
“persuasion is considered the centrally important mechanism for constructing and
reconstructing social facts.” Rodger A. Payne, Persuasion, Frames, and Norm Construction, 7
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 37, 38 (2001).
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socialize states in the absence of coercion or persuasion. These
studies conclude that the power of social influence can be
harnessed even if (1) collective action problems and political
constraints that inhibit effective coercion are not overcome and
(2) the complete internalization sought through persuasion is not
8
achieved. We contend that this scholarship now requires
a reexamination of the empirical foundations of human rights
regimes.
In this Article, we provide a more complete conceptual
framework by identifying a third mechanism by which international
law might change state behavior—acculturation. By acculturation, we
mean the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture. This mechanism
induces behavioral changes through pressures to assimilate—some
imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self. Acculturation
encompasses a number of microprocesses including mimicry,
identification, and status maximization. The touchstone of this
mechanism is that identification with a reference group generates
varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real or imagined—
to conform.9 We do not suggest that international legal scholarship

8. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1753–54 (2003) (outlining a general theoretical model founded on
acculturation mechanisms). We should note that some international legal scholars—most
notably Koh—advance theories relying in part on mechanisms that resemble what we call
acculturation. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 4, at 2646 (suggesting that “habitual obedience” is part
of the process of norm incorporation). Koh, however, has not identified what role, if any, globallevel acculturation processes might play in his theoretical model. In Koh’s model, processes that
most closely resemble acculturation occur at the final stage of norm implementation; they are
governed primarily by bureaucratic and administrative impulses to follow already accepted legal
rules. See, e.g., id. at 2655 (explaining that “institutional habits lead nations into default patterns
of compliance”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 651–53 (1998) (describing “bureaucratic compliance
procedures” as the cause for habitual compliance). As mentioned above, Koh’s discussion of
global-level norm diffusion borrows from political science scholarship on transnational advocacy
networks, which emphasizes the mechanism of persuasion. See supra note 7. That said, we
consider our project an extension of Koh’s and others’ work on transnational norm diffusion.
We intend to supplement that larger constructivist agenda by isolating the microprocesses of
social influence.
9. This insight is most fully developed in the “new institutionalism” in the social sciences.
Foundational works include THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); W. RICHARD SCOTT & JOHN W. MEYER,
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND
INDIVIDUALISM (1994); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977); Lynne G. Zucker,
Institutional Theories of Organization, 13 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 443–64 (1987) [hereinafter
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has completely failed to identify aspects of this process. Rather, we
maintain that the mechanism is underemphasized and poorly
understood, and that it is often conflated (or even confused) with
other constructivist mechanisms such as persuasion. Differentiating
the mechanism of acculturation and specifying the microprocesses
through which it operates are profoundly important, however, for
addressing questions pertaining to the adoption of international legal
norms. Indeed, each of the three mechanisms—coercion, persuasion,
and acculturation—is likely to have distinct implications along a
number of dimensions, including the durability of norms, the rates
and patterns of adoption, and the depth of compliance.
Additionally, we demonstrate how a close analysis of the
characteristics and function of each mechanism matters for regime
design. We link each of the three mechanisms of social influence to
specific regime characteristics—identifying several ways in which
identifying acculturation as distinct from the better-understood
mechanisms of coercion and persuasion may occasion a rethinking of
fundamental design problems in human rights law. In short, we
reverse-engineer structural regime design principles from the salient
characteristics of underlying social processes. We maintain that (1)
acculturation is a conceptually distinct social mechanism that
influences state behavior and (2) the regime design recommendations
issuing from acknowledging the role of acculturation defy
conventional wisdom in international human rights scholarship. We
contend that, without this understanding, several characteristics of
international society will frustrate regime design models that seek
compliance with human rights law solely by coercing and persuading
noncomplying states.
Careful readers may argue that the best approach to regime
design should incorporate elements of all three mechanisms. This
argument reflects the view that the identified mechanisms reinforce
each other through a dynamic relationship among them that is
sacrificed when a regime emphasizes one mechanism to the exclusion
of others. This is an important point, and it is almost certainly correct.
However, the kind of analysis contemplated by this line of criticism
(i.e., the development of an integrated theory of regime design
accounting for each mechanism) first requires, in our view,
identification and clear differentiation of these mechanisms. This
Zucker, Institutional Theories]; Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural
Persistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726, 726 (1977) [hereinafter Zucker, Role of Institutionalization].
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conceptual clarification is a first step, which enables subsequent work
aimed at identifying the conditions under which each of the
mechanisms would predominate, potentially reinforcing or frustrating
the operation of the others. Moreover, we think it useful to link
specific mechanisms to concrete regime design problems. Doing so
illustrates the design features suggested by each and further clarifies
the conceptual commitments of each mechanism. Our analysis of
regime design problems yields three models of human rights regimes
built on each of the mechanisms. But we do not suggest that any
regime does or should exhibit all of the features of a single
mechanism.10
Before we proceed with our analysis, it is important to note the
special characteristics of human rights regimes that bracket our
discussion and that make the investigation of socialization processes
especially productive in this arena. Most international regimes seek to
facilitate cooperation or coordination among states.11 The global
promotion of human rights, however, is importantly different from
12
both types of regimes. For several reasons, the prevalence of human
rights violations is not reducible to a simple collective action problem.
First, states have substantial capacity to promote and protect human
rights within their territory without coordinating their efforts with

10. In this sense, we offer our application of the mechanisms to regime design issues in the
spirit of Max Weber’s “ideal types.” See generally Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science
and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils &
Heary A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). Ideal types are theoretical constructs that model certain
aspects of the social world. These constructs are useful because they serve as the basis for a
particular brand of comparative analysis. By comparing an ideal type with a particular historical
(observable) case, one can determine the extent to which the elements emphasized in the ideal
type occur in reality. In other words, the ideal type is a useful tool that permits an assessment of
the extent to which certain attributes or processes exist in a particular case. Id.
11. Most international regimes confront pressing collective action problems. See generally
Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985) (describing the basic structure of
various collective action problems).
12. These distinctive features are well understood. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The
Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG.
217, 217 (2000) (“[I]nternational human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate
policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders, but to hold governments
accountable for purely internal activities. In contrast to most international regimes, moreover,
human rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action.”); see also JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119–127 (2005)
(arguing that modern multilateral human rights treaties exert little influence on how states
choose to behave because these treaties are not self-enforcing and lack effective external
enforcement).
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other states. Without question, states retain some substantial measure
of effective autonomy in this area. Second, many states have little
clear interest in promoting and protecting human rights abroad.
Although “bad actors” impose externalities on other states in
extreme cases (for example, when poor human rights conditions
trigger massive refugee flows), these externalities arise only
sporadically and typically affect only a few (bordering) states. Third,
many states have no interest in promoting and protecting human
rights domestically. Some states are simply willing to violate human
rights when it is convenient to do so, and they have no interest in
accepting structural commitments that may alter their current
decision processes. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems
in human rights law is how best to influence “bad actors” to make
fundamental changes. The question whether international law can
promote human rights norms may be recast, in an important sense, as
how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social
influence.
The task of designing effective human rights regimes is further
complicated by several structural characteristics of international
society that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies.
Consider two. First, international human rights norms are not selfenforcing.13 This point issues from the fact that human rights regimes
do not address coordination problems and that states have no clear,
direct interest in securing human rights protection in other states.
Second, good faith participants in such regimes are generally
unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement costs necessary to
coerce recalcitrant states to comply with human rights norms. This
“enforcement deficit”—exacerbated by high enforcement costs and
negligible direct returns—is a political reality of the current
international order.
The Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we introduce the
three mechanisms by which actors and institutions influence other
actors (and their practices). We emphasize the conceptual core of
each mechanism, analyzing in some detail the ways in which each is
distinct from the others. This exposition also identifies the schools of
thought and research programs that suggest the presence and
characteristics of each. We then apply these three mechanisms to
three foundational regime design problems in human rights law. In

13.

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12, at 109–10.
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Part II, we address the problem of membership—how best to define
the regime community and articulate regime boundaries. We then
consider, in Part III, the ways in which each mechanism would
approach the problem of defining the substantive obligations around
which a legal community is built. As an important instance of this
broad problem, we analyze the value of rule precision in defining
prescribed and proscribed conduct. In Part IV, we discuss how each
mechanism would approach the problem of compliance and
effectiveness—specifically how regimes might directly discourage
undesirable behavior and encourage desirable behavior. In short, we
assess the implications of each mechanism for common regime design
problems in human rights law by analyzing the ways in which design
recommendations issue from the underlying theory of social
influence. As a means of moving this discussion forward for future
research, we conclude briefly, in Part V, with some recommendations
for developing an integrated regime design model.
I. THREE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
According to conventional wisdom, there are two ways in which
international law and international regimes change state behavior (if
at all): coercion and persuasion.14 These explanations of state
behavior are conceptually coherent, empirically supported, and
important. However, substantial evidence suggests that the two
approaches do not exhaust the ways in which actors and institutions
exert influence on the behavior of others.15 As introduced above, we
suggest a third mechanism, acculturation, whereby conformity is
elicited through a range of socialization processes. To develop the
typology further, we first discuss in more detail the character of the
typology itself. We then describe the attributes of each mechanism. In
this Part, we seek only to model generally the three mechanisms. In
the remainder of the Article, we apply these models to several
concrete problems of regime design in human rights law.
Before we proceed, it is useful to make a couple of points about
the state of the field in international relations and international law as
it pertains to these mechanisms. Extending at least two decades back,

14. See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 12, at 220 (“Existing scholarship seeking to explain why
national governments establish and enforce formal international human rights norms focuses on
two modes of interstate interaction: coercion and normative persuasion.”).
15. See infra Part I.C.

GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC

2004]

SOCIALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

8/12/2005 10:48 AM

631

scholars have generally divided into two camps: rationalists and
constructivists. The former emphasizes military-economic power and
global material structure, whereas the latter emphasizes norms and
16
Despite
the
considerable
global
ideational
structure.
accomplishments of both camps, the microprocesses of social
influence are often underspecified, underanalyzed, or, at best,
underexplained. Several important questions merit more sustained
reflection. For example, how exactly do norms change behavior or
attitudes? Do social sanctions impose costs that states weigh against
other interests, or do social sanctions function more as cognitive
cues? If one mechanism through which norms influence actors is
“persuasion,” what exactly are the microprocesses by which
persuasion works? Our project calls for reorienting the academic
discussion toward such issues of microprocess. We discuss how the
mechanisms of coercion and persuasion work, in part, by contrasting
them with the third mechanism of acculturation.
Initially, note that these mechanisms are essentially theories of
how preferences form and the conditions under which preferences
change. These theories vary in their claims about whether, and to
what degree, international institutions prompt endogenous change in
the preferences and identities of actors. This immediately suggests
that our project is linked to ontological debates between rationalists
17
and constructivists in international relations theory. The typology
that we develop here does not track these debates. Indeed, many
constructivist scholars rely on coercion as a lever of change. These
scholars suggest that norms and ideas matter in international politics
in part because they provide a reservoir of symbolic authority that
may, in various ways, be brought to bear on recalcitrant states. For
example, socialization processes may exert direct influence over third
parties (e.g., donor countries), who in turn use traditional coercive
techniques to effect compliance in the target state. In this vein,
Professors Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that
transnational activist networks utilize international norms to
persuade domestic audiences to coerce target governments.18
Likewise, many rationalist scholars suggest that the social context of

16. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 33–38 (1999).
17. See James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical
View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 52.
18. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 16–25 (1998).
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international institutions (including the attendant structural
opportunities for persuasion and learning) influences the
effectiveness of traditional coercive techniques. For example,
Professor Lisa Martin argues that threats made within a highly
institutionalized environment are more credible because of the
19
greater ‘‘audience costs’’ in this social setting. And Professor
Leonard Schoppa suggests that coercive tactics are more effective
when they accord with widely shared procedural norms governing
international bargaining.20 It is fair to say that rationalists emphasize
the coercion mechanism21 and that constructivists emphasize the
persuasion mechanism,22 but the rationalist-constructivist debate
concerns matters that are, for the most part, beyond the scope of this
Article. Our typology outlines the microprocesses by which social
context influences actors—without building into these models
additional assumptions about the character of actors. Conventional
approaches de-emphasize, and often ignore, other ways in which
institutions and actors exert influence.23
One aspect of the prevailing theoretical landscape is that
acculturation sometimes appears obliquely in constructivist accounts
of human rights law. That is, constructivist scholars, in describing the
mechanics of “persuasion,” occasionally slip into accounts that rely on
various aspects of acculturation.24 Surveys of constructivist

19. Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,
45 WORLD POL. 406, 413 (1993).
20. Leonard J. Schoppa, The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining, 53 INT’L
ORG. 307, 310 (1999).
21. See, e.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and
International Institutions, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 12–13 (Daniel Drezner ed., 2003)
(associating coercion techniques with “the neorealist paradigm”); Johnston, supra note 5, at
489–90 (noting that neorealist theories often overlook techniques other than coercion).
22. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 495 (arguing that a focus on internalization causes
constructivists to “focus on persuasion”); Payne, supra note 7, at 38 (asserting that
constructivists focus on persuasive messages).
23. See, e.g., Drezner, supra note 21, at 11; Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in
International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1999).
24. See, e.g., Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction of
Sovereignty, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 519, 526–28 (2001); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in
THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 14
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (“In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialization
often involve processes such as shaming and denunciations . . . . Persuasion is also not devoid of
conflict. It often involves not just reasoning with opponents, but also pressures, arm-twisting,
and sanctions.”).
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scholarship, however, often expressly identify persuasion as the
25
central mechanism of social influence. This failure to differentiate
between importantly distinct social processes leaves undone several
important tasks, including defining the elements that differentiate
persuasion from social sanctions, examining whether social sanctions
exhaust the forms of acculturation, and determining when techniques
of persuasion and acculturation conflict. In the following discussion,
we draw from empirical studies that focus squarely on processes of
acculturation to define the distinctiveness and significance of each
mechanism.
In this Part, we develop in some detail the meaning of each of the
three mechanisms and briefly describe the research suggesting their
presence and general features. We do not attempt to prove or
disprove the empirical validity of the identified causal mechanisms. In
our view, substantial evidence suggests that each of these modes of
social influence occurs in global politics and that there are conditions
under which each is expected to predominate. An open question is
how the international community might employ this burgeoning
empirical record to build more effective, more responsive human
rights institutions. We consider each mechanism in turn.
A. Coercion
The first, and most obvious, social mechanism is coercion—
whereby states and institutions influence the behavior of other states
by escalating the benefits of conformity or the costs of nonconformity
through material rewards and punishments.26 Of course, coercion does
not necessarily involve any change in the target actor’s underlying
preferences. For example, even if state A would prefer to continue
practice X, it may discontinue the practice to avoid the sanctions
threatened by states B, C, and D. Note that the coercive gesture of
states B, C, and D would prove ineffective if state A perceived that
the expected benefit of practice X exceeded the expected cost of the
threatened sanctions. Take a more concrete example. The United
States, under the Foreign Assistance Act, denies foreign assistance to
states “engag[ing] in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
25. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 495 (“The focus on internalization tends to lead
constructivists to focus on persuasion.”); Payne, supra note 7, at 38 (pointing out that
“persuasion is considered the centrally important mechanism” for constructivists).
26. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 489–94 (noting that classic international relations
theories focus on “realpolitik pursuits of interest”); see also sources cited supra note 6.
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27
internationally recognized human rights.” Any state denied
assistance on this basis is thereby coerced to alter its behavior. Under
the logic of coercion, states and institutions change the behavior of
other states not by reorienting their preferences but by changing the
cost-benefit calculations of the target state. Also, although
international institutions do not reconfigure state interests and
preferences, they may, under certain conditions, constrain strategic
choices by stabilizing mutual expectations about state behavior.28 Put
simply, states change their behavior because they perceive it to be in
their material interest to do so.
Theories suggesting the predominance of coercion build on more
general theories about the character of international politics.
Proponents of this school of thought often contend that the material
distribution of power among states essentially determines state
29
behavior. Normative and institutional developments thus reflect the
interests of powerful states,30 and compliance with these norms is
31
largely a function of powerful states’ willingness to enforce them.
Consistent with this view, international institutions facilitate state
cooperation and coordination by reducing transaction costs and
overcoming other collective action problems. This perspective is
typically, though not exclusively, associated with “rationalist” or
rational choice approaches to international relations. As noted above,
however, coercion plays an important role in constructivist models of
state behavior as well.32

27. 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) (2000).
28. Even if international institutions do not further the coercive enterprise directly, they
might define more clearly what counts as a cooperative move. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 51–
55 (1984) (summarizing the process of international cooperation and “policy coordination”);
Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism, 51 INT’L
ORG. 31, 35–38 (1997).
29. See generally NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986)
(elaborating the foundations of this school of thought).
30. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (2001); Goldsmith &
Posner, Customary International Law, supra note 6, at 1174–75.
31. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in REGIME THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139, 165–67 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); A.M. Weisburd,
Implications of International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human Rights, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 101–11 (1999).
32. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
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B. Persuasion
The second mechanism of social influence is persuasion—the
33
active, often strategic, inculcation of norms. Persuasion theory
suggests that international law influences state behavior through
processes of social “learning” and other forms of information
conveyance.34 Persuasion “is not simply a process of manipulating
exogenous incentives to elicit desired behavior from the other side,”
but rather “requires argument and deliberation in an effort to change
the minds of others.”35 Persuaded actors “internalize” new norms and
rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their interests and
36
identities accordingly. The touchstone of this approach is that actors
are consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of
a norm, belief, or practice.37 That is, persuasion occurs when actors
actively assess the content of a particular message—a norm, practice,
38
or belief—and “change their minds.”
Next, consider how persuasion works—a matter explored in
39
depth in a vast, interdisciplinary literature. At the risk of
33. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 16; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 894–909 (1998); Thomas
Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 1 (2000). For
important legal arguments relying on a persuasion mechanism, see FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 40–46, and Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 278.
34. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
141 (1996) (arguing that even “[n]ormative claims become powerful and prevail by being
persuasive”).
35. Alastair Iain Johnston, The Social Effects of International Institutions on Domestic (and
Foreign Policy) Actors, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21, at 145, 153.
36. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary
Europe, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 83, 98–99 (1999) (illustrating that the diffusion of ideas led Germany
to develop new norms and behaviors with respect to citizenship and national minorities); Koh,
supra note 4, at 2646 (“[A] transaction generates a legal rule which will guide future
transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those
norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the
interests and even the identities of the participants in the process.”).
37. This is a long-held view in social psychology. See, e.g., CARL IVER HOVLAND ET AL.,
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE 10–12,
36–38 (1953) (outlining the steps in the persuasion process, including attention, comprehension,
and acceptance of message).
38. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 496 (“[Persuasion] involves changing minds,
opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or
mental coercion.”).
39. See THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) [hereinafter PERSUASION HANDBOOK]
(surveying literature across disciplines); PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE
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oversimplifying this rich and varied body of work, we highlight two
factors that determine, in substantial part, the persuasiveness of
counterattitudinal messages. The first and most important technique
of persuasion is “framing.” The basic idea is that the persuasive
appeal of a counterattitudinal message increases if the issue is
40
strategically framed to resonate with already accepted norms. Many
studies of this technique emphasize the role of strategic “norm
entrepreneurs,” who manipulate frames to resonate with target
audiences.41 One widely studied and highly successful example of such
strategic framing is the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines.
The campaign—which culminated in the Ottawa Convention banning
the production and use of the weapons—successfully framed the issue
in terms of the “indiscriminate nature and effects” of landmines,
thereby linking the issue with a universally accepted principle of
humanitarian law (and other successful campaigns against weapons of
mass destruction).42

PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 127–67 (1991) (surveying social
psychology literature); Diana Mutz et al., Political Persuasion: The Birth of a Field of Study, in
POLITICAL PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 1, 1–17 (Diana Mutz et al. eds., 1996)
(surveying political science research).
40. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 17–18; David A. Snow & Robert D.
Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization, in FROM STRUCTURE TO
ACTION: COMPARING SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH ACROSS CULTURES 197 (Bert
Klandermans et al. eds., 1988); David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes,
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 467–75 (1986)
(discussing types of frame alignment processes and transformations).
41. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929
(1996) (defining “norm entrepreneurs” as individuals who “can alert people to the existence of a
shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution. . . . (a) signaling their own commitment
to change, (b) creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms seem or be less costly, and
(d) making compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial”). International lawyers
have developed the concept in the context of transnational politics. See, e.g., Ethan A.
Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44
INT’L ORG. 479, 482 (1990) (defining transnational norm entrepreneurs as international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or individuals who (1) “mobilize popular opinion and
political support both within their host country and abroad”; (2) “stimulate and assist in the
creation of like-minded organizations in other countries”; (3) “play a significant role in elevating
their objective beyond its identification with the national interests of their government”; and (4)
often direct their efforts “toward persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a
peculiar . . . regime reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the
peculiar moral code of one society”); see also Koh, supra note 4, at 2612 (arguing that William
Wilberforce, Henry Dunant, William Ladd, and Elihu Burritt pioneered norm-generating
developments).
42. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land
Mines, 52 INT’L ORG. 613, 622–30 (1998).
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A second technique of persuasion is “cuing” target audiences to
“think harder” about the merits of a counterattitudinal message.
Cuing is based on the idea that the introduction of new information
often prompts actors to “engage in a high intensity process of
43
cognition, reflection, and argument.” Substantial empirical evidence
suggests that actors often change their beliefs when, faced with new
44
information, they systematically examine and defend their positions.
Given its general features, this microprocess works best in iterated,
highly institutionalized social environments wherein new information
is routinely and systematically linked to broadly shared attitudes.45 As
a practical matter, documentation and study of the extent of human
rights abuses (and the conditions under which abuses are likely)
might cue states to reexamine current practices and positions—
particularly within the framework of international human rights
institutions. For example, the extensive documentation of gross
human rights abuses in several Latin American military governments
in the 1970s and 1980s prompted states to reconsider the scope and
character of international human rights regimes.46 Important changes
followed in many intergovernmental organizations at the regional and
international levels.47 This example, however, should not encourage a
narrow view of the kind of information likely to produce these cuing
effects. Indeed, new information about the preferences of other states
might prompt states to reexamine their own views or practices.48 The
new information need not concern matters endogenous to the
international institution.

43. Johnston, supra note 5, at 496.
44. See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 39, at 192–97 (summarizing important
developments in the field).
45. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading
Russians to Tolerate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 819, 833–37 (1998).
46. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 89–97 (summarizing these developments).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 33, at 895–905 (arguing that norm
internalization occurs when the number of states accepting a norm reaches a “tipping point”
triggering “norm cascades”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1187 (1997) (noting that group identity and norm enforcement “are especially
important to law and, in particular, to the relationship between law and ‘norm cascades,’” which
produce “large-scale behavioral shifts”); Sunstein, supra note 41, at 909 (“Norm bandwagons
occur when small shifts lead to large ones, as people join the ‘bandwagon’; norm cascades occur
when there are rapid shifts in norms.”).
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Cuing often operates more like “teaching”—depending on the
49
character of the issue and the predisposition of the relevant actors.
In some circumstances, actors and institutions might convince target
audiences to discard previously held views by conveying authoritative
information discrediting those views.50 This specie of cuing is
particularly important in addressing inadvertent or uninformed
51
nonobservance of community standards.
C. Acculturation
A burgeoning, interdisciplinary literature suggests another
important mechanism of social influence—acculturation. By
acculturation, we mean the general process of adopting the beliefs
and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.52 This mechanism
induces behavioral changes through pressures to assimilate—some
53
imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self.
Acculturation encompasses a number of microprocesses, including
54
orthodoxy, mimicry, identification, and status maximization. Our
claim is that individual behavior (and community-level behavioral
regularities) is in part a function of social structure—the relations
between individual actors and some reference group(s).
Acculturation induces behavioral changes not only by changing the
target actor’s incentive structure or mind but also by changing the
actor’s social environment. In this Section, we first specify some of

49. See, e.g., FINNEMORE, supra note 34, at 135–39 (discussing the importance of the
“interaction between international structures and local agents of change”).
50. See id. at 34–68 (discussing the example of the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)).
51. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 17–28; see also Jonas Tallberg, Paths to
Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 INT’L ORG. 609, 613–14
(2002).
52. See generally RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES: DYNAMICS WITHIN AND
BETWEEN GROUPS 53–64, 123–66 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the dynamics of this process and
summarizing empirical research).
53. See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9,
at 1–38; SCOTT & MEYER, supra note 9, at 100–10 (discussing the institutional conditions that
lead to diffusion of ideas and social persuasion); Meyer & Rowan, supra note 9, at 348–58;
Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 450–60; Zucker, Role of Institutionalization,
supra note 9, at 730–41.
54. See, e.g., Elvin Hatch, Theories of Social Honor, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 341 (1989)
(summarizing cross-cultural research); Johnston, supra note 5, at 499–502 (summarizing
research on this point across several disciplines); see also ROMANO HARRE, SOCIAL BEING: A
THEORY FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1979) (providing a more extended statement of this
research agenda in psychology and sociology).
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the ways in which acculturation occurs. We then clarify the
relationship between this mechanism and the other two previously
discussed. Finally, we analyze (at a conceptually abstract level) how
institutions might harness acculturation to socialize recalcitrant states.
1. The Microprocesses of Acculturation. The touchstone of
acculturation is that varying degrees of identification with a reference
group generate varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real
55
or imagined—to conform. The operation of this mechanism is best
understood by reference to well-documented individual-level
phenomena. One of the central insights of social psychology is that
individual behavior and cognition reflect substantial social influence.56
Actors, in an important sense, are influenced by their environment;
indeed, this generalized influence is one important way that “culture”
is transmitted and reproduced. Although culture is typically
understood as “learned behavior,” much of what actors absorb from
their social environment is not simply “informational social
influence.”57 Children, for example, do not simply learn a menu of
culturally significant facts. Rather, the acculturation of children
involves both the transmission of information and the inculcation of
social values and norms. Social influence is a rich process—one that
also includes “normative social influence” whereby actors are
impelled to adopt appropriate attitudes and behaviors. We explain
here the cognitive and social aspects of normative social influence.58
We also identify evidence suggesting their presence and form. We do
not intend to dwell on points that will strike many readers as
obviously true. Our objective here is only to identify, with some
conceptual precision, the salient general characteristics of the
acculturation process.

55. See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 250–97 (4th ed. 2002) (identifying
when people tend to conform to normative social influences).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 255–63.
58. As a conceptual matter, the cognitive and social processes identified are somewhat
imprecise. Without question, some of the processes that we label “cognitive” are importantly
“social” and vice versa. In addition, the cognitive and social microprocesses are mutually
reinforcing. Although a more formal (and more extended) treatment would clarify the
conceptual boundaries (and feedback loops) between these two levels of acculturation, such an
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, we need only identify some of the
ways in which acculturation works—and we need only specify these microprocesses with
sufficient precision to facilitate a sensible comparison with coercion and persuasion.

GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC

640

8/12/2005 10:48 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:621

First, acculturation is propelled by cognitive pressures. Actors in
several respects are driven to conform. These internal pressures
include (1) social-psychological costs of nonconformity (such as
dissonance associated with conduct that is inconsistent with an actor’s
59
identity or social roles), and (2) social-psychological benefits of
conforming to group norms and expectations (such as the “cognitive
60
comfort” associated with both high social status and membership in
61
a perceived “in-group” ). “Cognitive dissonance”—defined broadly
as the discomfort caused by holding two or more inconsistent
62
cognitions—is a useful example. This phenomenon is part of a family
of cognitive processes related to the basic human need to justify one’s
63
actions to oneself and others. Substantial empirical evidence
demonstrates that individuals experience discomfort—including
anxiety, regret, and guilt—whenever they confront cognitions about
some aspect of their behavior inconsistent with their self-concept
(including any social roles central to their identity).64 Individuals are
highly motivated to minimize this dissonance by either changing their
65
behavior or finding ways to justify their past behavior. Therefore,
there are internal pressures driving actors to act and think in ways
consistent with the social roles and expectations internalized by such
59. See, e.g., JOHN C. TURNER, REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELFCATEGORIZATION THEORY 68–69 (1987); Robert Axelrod, Promoting Norms: An Evolutionary
Approach to Norms, in THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 44, 55–57 (Robert Axelrod ed.,
1997); Christopher Barnum, A Reformulated Social Identity Theory, 14 ADVANCES IN GROUP
PROCESSES 29 (1997).
60. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
THE QUEST FOR STATUS 31–33 (1985) (arguing that high status is a good itself—generating a
range of psychological benefits); see also ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE
STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 71–95 (1988) (discussing how the “sincere-manner” and
“reputation” pathways lead individuals to develop moral sentiments).
61. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN
PERSUASION 163–99 (1984) (suggesting that individuals are most likely to adhere to certain
behavior if other individuals with whom they identify are displaying that behavior).
62. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); see
also generally Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 3–19 (Eddie
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999).
63. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 173–212.
64. See id. at 174–76.
65. See, e.g., SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION
AND THE HEALTHY MIND 123–33 (1989) (summarizing various methods of dealing with
dissonance, such as illusion, repression, and denial); Frederick X. Gibbons et al., Cognitive
Reactions to Smoking Relapse: The Reciprocal Relations Between Dissonance and Self Esteem,
72 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 184, 192 (1997) (suggesting that people with high self-esteem are
more defensive when faced with dissonance).
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actors. An implication of this pressure is that, once actors internalize
some role (or any other identity formation), they are impelled to act
and think in ways consistent with the highly legitimated purposes and
66
attributes of that role. As a consequence, orthodoxy and social
legitimacy are internalized as authoritative guides for human action.67
Second, acculturation is also propelled by social pressures—real
or imagined pressures applied by a group. These pressures—which
are no doubt more familiar to many readers—include (1) the
imposition of social-psychological costs through shaming or shunning
and (2) the conferral of social-psychological benefits through “backpatting” and other displays of public approval.68 In short, actors hoard
social legitimacy and social status, and they minimize social
disapproval. Consider, for example, social-psychological studies of
conformity. Substantial empirical evidence demonstrates that, in the
face of real or perceived social pressure from a reference group,
actors often change their behavior to conform to the behavioral
patterns of the group.69 Moreover, actors systematically conform
(under the right conditions) even if the group is clearly wrong and
even if there are strong incentives to be accurate.70 Because this
variant of acculturation results from external pressure, it often leads

66. See, e.g., E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, in THE
SELF IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 152–71 (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 1999); E. Tory Higgins, The “Self
Digest”: Self-Knowledge Serving Self Regulatory Functions, 71 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1062,
1067–72 (1996); E. Tory Higgins & John A. Bargh, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 38
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 369, 382–87 (1987).
67. One consequence is that actors seek reliable models of appropriate behavior.
Therefore, actors “mimic” the behavior of other highly legitimated actors. This effect is well
documented in the sociology of organizations literature. See, e.g., W. RICHARD SCOTT,
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 124–28 (1995) (discussing, in the context of collective
responses to institutional environments, how states mimic behavior).
68. See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 61, at 23–27 (describing the many components of what
the author terms “weapons of automatic influence”); Richard E. Petty et al., Attitudes and
Attitude Change, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 609, 612–20 (1997). These microprocesses are well
represented in the international law literature—though they are typically embedded in a
coercion model of social influence. See, e.g., Risse & Sikkink, supra note 24, at 11–35 (outlining
a “spiral model” of socialization incorporating elements of coercion, persuasion, and shaming).
69. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 250–97 (discussing the roles of conformity
and social pressure).
70. See, e.g., Robert S. Baron et al., The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact
of Task Importance on Social Influence, 71 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 915, 924 (1996) (providing
two case studies that found that “heightening incentives for accuracy actually heightened
participants’ susceptibility to an inaccurate group consensus”).
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to public compliance with, but not private acceptance of, social
71
norms.
Importantly, actors obviously do not always bow to social
pressure. The influential “social impact theory” provides one useful
way to condense the empirical record into a small cluster of factors
that determine the likelihood of success for social pressure. Social
impact theory suggests that the likelihood of conformity turns on the
strength, immediacy, and size of the group.72 Each of these variables is
positively correlated with effective social influence: (1) conformity
with group norms becomes more likely as the importance of the
group to the target actor increases (and as the importance of the issue
to the group increases); (2) conformity increases as the target actor’s
exposure to the group increases; and (3) conformity increases—up to
a point—as the size of the reference group increases.73
To summarize briefly, actors are amenable to social influence via
acculturation processes. These processes—including orthodoxy,
mimicry, and status maximization—mobilize internal and external
pressures impelling actors, under the right conditions, to adopt
socially legitimated attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Next we address
a few important questions that derive from this foundation: whether
this mechanism is importantly different than coercion and persuasion,
and whether (and in what manner) states are amenable to this type of
social influence.
2. Acculturation as Incomplete Internalization: Distinguishing
Persuasion. Despite the obvious similarities, acculturation differs
from persuasion in important respects. First, persuasion requires
acceptance of the validity or legitimacy of a belief, practice, or
norm—acculturation requires only that an actor perceive that an
important reference group harbors the belief, engages in the practice,

71. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 264 (collecting citations to other research).
72. See, e.g., Bibb Latané et al., Measuring Emergent Social Phenomena: Dynamism,
Polarization, and Clustering as Order Parameters of Social Systems, 39 BEHAV. SCI. 1, 1–22
(1994); Bibb Latané, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 343, 343–54
(1981).
73. This last point requires some clarification. The empirical record suggests that group size
is positively correlated with social influence/conformity up to a certain point (typically from
three to eight or so), but then the effect diminishes rapidly. In other words, going from two to
three group members matters far more than going from twenty-two to twenty-three or ninetytwo to ninety-three. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 275–77 (discussing the importance
of group dynamics).
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or subscribes to the norm. Second, persuasion requires active
74
assessment of the merits of a belief. Acculturation processes, in
contrast, frequently operate tacitly; it is often the very act of
conforming that garners social approval and alleviates cognitive
discomfort.75 Persuasion involves assessment of the content of the
message (even if only indirectly); acculturation involves assessment of
the social relation (the degree of identification) between the target
audience and some group. Acculturation occurs not as a result of the
content of the relevant rule or norm but rather as a function of social
structure—the relations between individual actors and some
reference group. Acculturation depends less on the properties of the
rule than on the properties of the relationship of the actor to the
community. Because the acculturation process does not involve
actually agreeing with the merits of a group’s position, it may result in
outward conformity with a social convention without private
acceptance or corresponding changes in private practices.

74. It is also important to note that we include in our conception of acculturation a
microprocess identified in the persuasion literature. One well-documented finding is that the
relationship between the persuader and the target audience may foster (or impede) “persuasion.”
That is, the “persuasiveness” of a message—controlling for its content—varies according to the
relationship between the persuader and persuadee. Although this factor is not central in human
rights literature, it is important to mention this dimension of acculturation because of its
significance for institutional design in general. Again, the scholarship studying various
manifestations of this dynamic is vast, but for our purposes we highlight one important point:
substantial evidence suggests that positive affect relationships foster “persuasion.” See
PERSUASION HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 289–328 (summarizing recent developments in this
research). The idea here is simple. If the persuadee trusts, “likes,” respects, or identifies with the
persuader, the persuasiveness of claims advanced by the persuader increases. See, e.g., James H.
Kuklinski & Norman L. Hurley, It’s a Matter of Interpretation, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND
ATTITUDE CHANGE, supra note 39, at 129–31; Petty et al., supra note 68, at 612–29 (reviewing
empirical developments on attitudes and persuasion). In the international relations literature
specifically, see Risse, supra note 33, at 20–21, arguing that “trust in the authenticity of the
speaker is a precondition for the persuasiveness of a moral argument.” Moreover, a related
finding of these studies is that such affect relations are fostered in iterated, highly
institutionalized environments. Id. Examples of this microprocess abound. Consider Professor
Steven Ratner’s study of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Professor Ratner demonstrates that such “normative
intermediaries,” if perceived as impartial and legitimate, persuade states (and other parties to
ethnic conflicts) to de-escalate tensions and embrace rule-of-law values in their dealings with
each other. Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 591, 678–83 (2000). In this example, the perceived impartiality and
legitimacy of the persuader imbued him with normative authority and instilled trust in the target
audience. Id. at 681–82. Because, in this scenario, the persuadee does not actively assess the
content of the message, we classify this affect-driven “persuasion” as “acculturation.”
75. See tbl. 1.
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These insights are obviously constructivist in that they emphasize
the role of social interaction in preference and identity formation. As
such, the acculturation mechanism shares many conceptual
commitments with the persuasion mechanism. Indeed, it is fair to say
that acculturation is, in many respects, part of the broader process of
persuasion. That is, acculturation may serve as the cultural predicate
for all acts of persuasion. Regardless of whether this claim is accurate,
the analytical distinction between the two mechanisms is coherent
and meaningful. Moreover, because complete “internalization” is
often elusive in international affairs—particularly on many
contentious human rights issues—international legal studies should
fashion a framework for analyzing socialization that falls short of this
standard. We maintain that social forces influence actors in many
ways other than internalization and that law and legal institutions
might harness these social forces to promote rule-of-law values.
Critics might argue that this distinction between acculturation
and persuasion has no difference. There are two variants of this
criticism: (1) the conceptual distinction is not amenable to systematic
empirical testing because it is not falsifiable and (2) the conceptual
distinction is so fine that no important regime design choices turn on
it. Both variants miss the mark. First, substantial empirical evidence
demonstrates the presence and importance of acculturation as a
76
distinct mode of social influence. The empirical research in
psychology, sociology, and political science also strongly suggests the
importance of processes of acculturation in shaping state identity,
preferences, interests, and behavior.77 Some of these studies
emphasize the significance of group identification and cognitive
frames in influencing state action.78 The studies also predict spurious
forms of compliance and peculiar patterns of norm diffusion
79
associated with acculturation. Second, this distinction, though fine,
matters for regime design. As we analyze in great detail below, the

76. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 173–212; SCOTT, supra note 67, at 44–45.
77. See generally Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1753–65 (summarizing this empirical
work).
78. See, e.g., John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority and
Organizations, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL 21 (George Thomas et al. eds., 1987); John W. Meyer et al., World
Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 149–57 (1997).
79. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1758–61; John W. Meyer et al., supra note
78, at 155–58 (describing “decoupling” and “expansive structuration”).
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unique characteristics of acculturation favor regime design choices
80
that are antithetical to the choices suggested by persuasion.
3. Acculturation
as
Social
Sanctions
and
Rewards:
Distinguishing Coercion. The distinction between acculturation and
coercion also requires some clarification. Although the distinction is
clear at a high level of abstraction, the way in which we define
acculturation potentially blurs the distinction between the two at a
lower level of abstraction. Recall that, on our view, acculturation
processes include social sanctions and rewards, such as shaming and
back-patting.81 Many readers will justifiably think that this definition
of acculturation eviscerates the distinction between coercion and
acculturation and that, as a consequence, social sanctions and rewards
should be part of the coercion category.
The conceptual distinction between coercion and acculturation,
however, is straightforward. Coercion encompasses social sanctions
that influence actors because those actors conclude that social costs
will translate into material costs. Acculturation, on the other hand,
includes these coercive elements only to the extent that social costs, in
and of themselves, influence thought and action. This dimension of
acculturation captures those circumstances in which actors conform to
social pressure not because of a second-order calculation of the
specific costs and benefits but rather because “conforming” and
“belonging” themselves confer substantial affective returns
(“cognitive comfort”).82 In addition, actors are engaged in the
generalized pursuit of social legitimacy—and this orientation is
83
deeply internalized.
Simple coercion models cannot adequately account for these
effects because the costs and benefits associated with specific decision
points are too vague and diffuse to guide action in any meaningful
sense. Indeed, economists recognize a sharp theoretical distinction
84
between “material preferences” and “social preferences.” Moreover,
there are good reasons to analyze pure social costs differently.

80.
81.
82.

See infra Parts II–IV.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See, e.g., TIM WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS (2002).
83. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 501.
84. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR.
ECON. REV. 687, 689 (2002) (explaining the distinction).
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Consider that these costs are virtually incalculable; indeed, much
social science evidence suggests that actors do not attempt to
85
calculate them in any systematic way. In addition, substantial
evidence suggests that actors systematically fail to forecast accurately
their future affective states (and the impact that certain practices will
have on those states).86 In contrast, the expected influence and effects
of material rewards are more amenable to conventional cost-benefit
modeling.
4. Acculturation and the State. Although substantial evidence
demonstrates that acculturation processes occur and, more precisely,
how they take place, there is good reason to question whether states
as such are amenable to acculturation. After all, much of the research
suggesting the presence of this mechanism centers on the cognitive
processes of individuals. Do states “identify” with a reference group
in any meaningful sense? Do states respond to cognitive frameworks
and social pressures? Substantial evidence strongly suggests, on both
counts, that they do. As we summarize in an earlier article, there is a
rich empirical (and theoretical) literature—so-called “world polity
institutionalism”—documenting cultural and associational aspects of
international politics that suggest the influence of acculturation on
state action.87 This scholarship has direct roots in the sociology of
organizations and, more specifically, in empirical studies that
demonstrate how the goals and composition of formal organizations
such as corporations, universities, and public hospitals derive in
considerable part from their wider social environment.88 A
methodologically simple, yet enormously useful, innovation is to

85. Recent empirical work on cognitive organization suggests that actors often engage in
affect-based decisionmaking rather than reason-based decisionmaking. See, e.g., Melissa L.
Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 327 (Sandra L. Schneider & James
Shanteau eds., 2003) (describing the “affect heuristic”). Moreover, substantial evidence suggests
that actors do not calculate utility systematically (or even reliably). See, e.g., JONATHAN
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 303–33 (3d ed. 2000) (describing multiple deficiencies in
valuation); id. at 357–80 (describing common cognitive errors in quantitative assessments).
86. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert & Tim Wilson, Affective Forecasting, in 35 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 345, 383 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2003) (arguing that “affective
forecast[ing]” is hindered by “misconstruing the nature of the future event, errors in recall of
past emotional experiences, faulty affective theories, failures to correct for unique influences on
forecasts, and framing”).
87. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1757–65.
88. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 44–45.
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study the state as a formal organization—taking the sociology of
organizations to the global level.
In organizational sociology, theories of acculturation predict that
socialization processes will press organizations toward increasing
“isomorphism”—that is, structural similarity across organizations.89
These theoretical models also predict that increasing homogenization
will not reflect the functional task demands of organizations.90 Rather
than correlating with local task demands, structural attributes and
goals of an organization will correlate with attributes and goals of
other organizations at the time.91 When institutional conditions are
favorable for acculturation, the evidence suggests that the previously
identified cognitive and social pressures will encourage compliance
with social norms.
Isolating these institutional conditions is more difficult.
Nevertheless, the microprocesses of acculturation, particularly “social
impact theory,” suggests two requirements for the effective
functioning of this mechanism: (1) embedding target actors in an
institutionalized social setting and (2) institutionalizing at the group
level preferred forms of identity.92 The general directive is clear:
change the individual’s connection to the wider cultural community
or change the content of culturally legitimated practices. The question
is whether states, like other organizational forms, respond to and are
in significant part reflections of their wider institutional environment.
Numerous empirical studies now suggest that states are
significantly shaped and legitimated through their broader
93
organizational environment. States are highly legitimated actors in
89. Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 452 (surveying the literature).
90. See generally THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 9 (explaining the empirical predications of various institutional approaches); see also
generally Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 443 (providing a general overview of
institutional theories of organization).
91. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 67, at 115–116.
92. Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 453.
93. Our approach is “constructivist” in that we emphasize the importance of social
interaction. We advance the view that state structure, identity, and preferences are constructed
by social forces. Nevertheless, our approach contrasts with conventional constructivist models in
two respects: (1) we emphasize top-down processes; and (2) we identify acculturation (rather
than habitualization and persuasion) as the causal mechanism that drives the emergence and
diffusion of global scripts. We should emphasize at the outset that our approach avoids two
common pitfalls in constructivist research. First, our approach is falsifiable in that it generates a
range of concrete empirical predictions that facilitate the assessment of our approach against
competing explanations. Second, our approach avoids the circularity problem endemic to some
constructivist research. Indeed, constructivist research often fails to distinguish adequately
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world society, and their formal structures (e.g., administrative bodies,
policy commitments) substantially derive from institutionalized
94
models promulgated at the global level. These studies generally
proceed by collecting quantitative data for all available states over
several decades and employing analytic techniques—including event
history analysis, regression analysis, and process tracing—to test
predictions of acculturation. The studies demonstrate that states
emulate standardized models of structural organization in areas such
as environmental policy,95 educational curricula,96 militarization,97 the
laws of war,98 and human rights.99 As many commentators point out,
the extent of isomorphism across states is remarkable, and it is

between explanatory and outcome variables. The “new institutionalism” that we embrace
distinguishes between “organizations” and “institutions”: the concept of “organization” refers
to the formal apparatus (and its purposes), whereas the concept of “institution” refers to all
regulative and cognitive features of the organizational environment such as rules or shared
beliefs. Of course, many “institutions” can also be understood as “organizations” depending on
the object of the study. For example, in a study of the organizational features of hospitals, the
state (including, perhaps most prominently, regulatory agencies) are part of the institutional
environment within which hospitals operate. But, in a study of the organizational features of
state regulatory agencies, it is the agencies themselves that are analyzed as “organizations” (and
“institutions” in this study would include the salient features of the wider cultural environment
in which the agencies are embedded). The important point is that our approach avoids
circularity problems by clearly differentiating, as an analytic matter, explanatory variables
(institutions) and outcome variables (organizations). See generally SCOTT, supra note 67;
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8.
94. E.g., Meyer et al., supra note 78.
95. David John Frank et al., Environmentalism as a Global Institution, 65 AM. SOC. REV.
122, 122–26 (2000) [hereinafter Frank et al., Environmentalism]; David John Frank et al., The
Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 96,
100–03 (2000) [hereinafter Frank et al., The Nation-State].
96. John W. Meyer, Introduction to JOHN W. MEYER ET AL., SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE FOR
THE MASSES: WORLD MODELS AND NATIONAL PRIMARY CURRICULAR CATEGORIES IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 1–2 (1992); see also John W. Meyer et al., World Expansion of Mass
Education, 1870–1980, 65 SOC. EDUC. 128, 131–32 (1992) [hereinafter Meyer et al., World
Expansion of Mass Education].
97. E.g., Dana P. Eyre & Mark C. Suchman, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of
Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 79, 86–87 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed.,
1996).
98. E.g., Martha Finnemore, Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross
and the Restraint of State Violence, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875, at 149 (John Boli & George M. Thomas
eds., 1999).
99. See infra notes 102–08 (discussing norm diffusion with respect to human rights
standards).
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seemingly inexplicable without reference to acculturation processes.
Importantly, the studies do not suggest that this structural
101
convergence reflects actual practices or effects on the ground. On
the contrary, the convergence (across states) is accompanied by
substantial and persistent “decoupling” (within states): official
purposes and formal structure are disconnected from functional
demands. Rather than correlating with local task demands, structural
attributes and official goals of the state correlate in important ways
with attributes and goals of other states in the world.
With respect to human rights, extensive research identifies these
patterns of norm diffusion in fundamental areas of governance
102
103
including welfare and labor policy, civil rights guarantees, and
104
public order maintenance. For example, the number of constitutions
that include provisions committed to the state management of
105
childhood and the right to education has increased dramatically. A
study of every national constitution in effect during the 1870–1970

100. Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 144–45; see David John Frank et al., What Counts As
History: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Study of University Curricula, 44 COMP. EDUC.
REV. 29, 31–32 (2000) (considering “the ways in which world models of ‘society’ underlie
changes in university history curricula”). See generally CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE,
supra note 98 (presenting a series of articles on this topic by various authors). Indeed,
“institutionalists would expect roughly contemporaneous global change, regardless of objective
technological conditions.” Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from
Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 338 (1996).
101. Meaningful change, however, becomes possible as the incorporated elements of global
culture accumulate. Several of the examples discussed below represent important success
stories: women’s suffrage, childhood education, and decolonization. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text; infra notes 109–18, 126 and accompanying text. Our point here is only that
global diffusion patterns and rates do not correlate with individual state preferences.
102. Andrew Abbott & Stanley DeViney, The Welfare State as Transnational Event:
Evidence from Sequences of Policy Adoption, 16 SOC. SCI. HIST. 245, 266 (1992); David Strang
& Patricia Mei Yin Chang, The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State:
Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960–80, 47 INT’L ORG. 235, 235 (1993);
George M. Thomas & Pat Lauderdale, State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the
World System Context, 3 SOC. FORUM 383, 383 (1988).
103. John Boli, Human Rights or State Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of
Constitutional Rights, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE,
SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 78, at 72–73; see also David John Frank &
Elizabeth H. McEneaney, The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State
Policies on Same-Sex Sexual Relations, 1984–1995, 77 SOC. FORCES 911–12 (1999).
104. CONNIE L. MCNEELY, CONSTRUCTING THE NATION-STATE: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND PRESCRIPTIVE ACTION 55–57 (1995); Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 158.
105. John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules
Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870–1970, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 797, 804 tbl.1
(1978).
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period shows that the adoption of such constitutional provisions over
time does not correlate with local forms of social organization (such
as urbanization and national wealth) or with technical capacities of
106
the relevant states. Moreover, each group of newly established
states shows a significantly higher probability of adopting such
107
constitutional provisions than the preceding group of entrants. The
overall findings suggest that “[n]ational constitutions do not simply
reflect processes of internal development,” but rather “reflect
legitimating ideas dominant in the world system at the time of their
creation.”108
Consider, also, state convergence with respect to women’s rights.
A leading study uses sophisticated analytic techniques to examine
109
state definitions of political citizenship over a hundred-year period.
According to the study, once universal suffrage became a legitimating
principle associated with the modern nation-state, state enactment of
women’s suffrage followed a pattern anticipated by theories of
110
acculturation. After an initial stage of early adopters, the number of
states providing women the right to vote increased steeply and
included most states before the rate of adoption tapered off; the
likelihood that a state would adopt women’s suffrage correlated with
world trend lines; and adoption correlated far less with domestic
political conditions once isomorphism took hold.111 Additionally, an
important finding indicates a “contagion” effect: once the norm was
institutionalized, a strong predictor for whether an individual state
would enact women’s suffrage was whether other states in its region
112
had done so in the past five years. The overall findings suggest that,
compared with local conditions such as the strength of domestic
women’s rights groups, “[c]ountries apparently are affected much less
strongly by internal factors and much more strongly by shifts in the
international logic of political citizenship.”113

106. Id. at 807–09.
107. Id. at 805.
108. Id.
109. See Francisco O. Ramirez et al., The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: CrossNational Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 735, 738–39
(1997) (using event history analysis).
110. Id. at 743.
111. Id. at 741–42 & tbl.1.
112. Id. at 740.
113. Id. at 742.
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These results are consistent with observations in other areas of
women’s rights. For example, a separate study of states in the western
hemisphere examines how these governments made roughly
contemporaneous commitments to eradicate violence against
114
women. Within a relatively short time span, “[n]early all American
states . . . created national women’s councils that include[d] domestic
violence problems among their priorities, . . . approved legal changes
that define[d] domestic violence as a crime, . . . launched educational
campaigns to combat the problem, and . . . created social services for
victims.”115 States also made these advances uniformly; no one state
substantially exceeded, or distinguished itself from, the average set of
116
The extent of this isomorphism despite wide
commitments.
variations in national-level political, cultural, and social conditions is
remarkable. Specifically, once the obligation to address domestic
violence was institutionalized at the regional level, states joined the
bandwagon despite dramatic differences in women’s political power
or access to economic resources at the national level.117 Indeed, the
study concludes that, at this stage of institutionalization,
“international socialization is more important than domestic politics”
in getting “nonconformist states to change their policies to meet the
118
standards of new international norms.”
In general, the adoption of structural commitments or official
policy goals in human rights does not necessarily entail concrete
implementation. On the contrary, when states copy an internationally
legitimated model that does not fit their local needs, one should
expect a continued disjuncture between structural isomorphism
(across states) and technical demands and results (within states). For
example, the authors of the study of state management of childhood
“d[o] not argue that constitutional rules in particular countries are
likely to be ‘implemented,’ but, rather, that prevailing world
ideologies are likely to be incorporated both ideologically and

114. Darren Hawkins & Melissa Humes, Human Rights and Domestic Violence, 117 POL.
SCI. Q. 231, 235 (2002).
115. Id. at 234; see also id. at 235 (finding that the states “share important similarities in the
ways in which they identify national goals, institutionalize guidelines and procedures . . . and
outline programs to prevent abuse and to treat victims”).
116. Id. at 234; see also id. at 234–35 (discussing other comparative studies).
117. Id. at 255–56.
118. Id. at 256.
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119
organizationally.” The fact that local social and economic drivers do
not explain when states adopt the observed constitutional provisions,
and the fact that adoption of such constitutional guarantees does not
correlate with technical capacities to implement the provisions,
suggest that decoupling might persist. Similarly, the study of domestic
violence finds that many of the official commitments remain
“woefully underfunded”120 and that subsequent implementation of
these programs “is still unclear.”121 Indeed, as explained above with
respect to the sociology of organizations in general, the theory of
acculturation predicts cross-national isomorphism irrespective of local
circumstances.122 Because these models have developed universal
authority and legitimacy, states follow the global scripts as members
of world society despite the ineffectiveness (or even dysfunctionality)
of resultant organizational forms.
We maintain that the evidence of structural isomorphism and
decoupling discredit theories that explain state behavior solely in
terms of global power politics. To clarify why this is so, we consider
an important alternative explanation. Specifically, critics might accept
that the empirical evidence indicates an external source of state
organizational formation but might argue that the external source
could be powerful actors compelling states through material penalties
or rewards to adopt particular practices. This account, however, is
unpersuasive. First, although one would assume that poorer countries
are more susceptible to such external coercion, the empirical studies
discussed above show that norm adoption does not correlate with the
economic wealth or development of countries.123 Second, this
explanation would predict that mimicry (and, hence, isomorphism)
would vary depending on the presence, power, and influence of
relevant audiences. Substantial evidence, however, shows that
isomorphism will frequently occur regardless of whether there is
external political pressure to conform. For example, governments
follow global scripts concerning the proper orientation of state policy

119. John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, Constitutions as Ideology, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 525,
526 (1980); cf. Boli-Bennett & Meyer, supra note 105, at 809 (“[P]olitical ideologies defining the
state as responsible for childhood . . . . are worldwide creatures most fully expressed in
societies . . . where the general depiction of the state as ultimately responsible for social life and
social progress is strongest.”).
120. Hawkins & Humes, supra note 114, at 236.
121. Id. at 257.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92.
123. See sources cited supra notes 83–100.
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toward children—even though powerful states do not exhibit a strong
124
interest in monitoring or forcing others to adopt such an ideology.
Third, powerful states are often late adopters in some issue areas,
125
including human rights law. Fourth, counterhegemonic norms
exhibit the same pattern of diffusion as prohegemonic norms,
suggesting that conventional conceptions of global power politics
provide an inadequate descriptive account. One important example is
the norm of self-determination (understood as a fundamental human
right), which supported decolonization and motivated many
indigenous rights campaigns.126 Finally, the coercion explanation
cannot account for persistent decoupling; there is no convincing
theory to explain why formal policy convergence without effective
implementation on the ground would appease powerful states.127

124. See, e.g., Boli-Bennett & Meyer, supra note 105, at 810. Professors Boli-Bennett and
Meyer’s study discusses the state’s differentiation of childhood as a distinct life phase and state
management of childhood in spheres such as criminal justice, education, family, and labor
between 1870 and 1970. Id. at 797–98, 804. Notably, even in the area of child labor, which one
might think is a matter of high politics, the institutionalization of global practices occurred
before powerful states became seriously involved at the international level. See, e.g., Bozena
Maria Celek, Note, The International Response to Child Labor in the Developing World: Why
Are We Ineffective?, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 87, 91 (2004) (“States ignored the issue
and instead concentrated their discussions on the industrial developments of Europe and North
America—nations where child labor hardly was as prevalent as in the developing states. This
trend of neglecting child labor issues continued until approximately 1973 . . . .”) (citing Hugh
Cunningham, The Rights of the Child and the Wrongs of Child Labor: A Historical Perspective,
in 13 CHILD LABOR: POLICY OPTIONS 20, 21 (Kristoffel Lieten & Ben White eds., 2001)).
125. See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 33, at 895–96 (describing global diffusion of
women’s suffrage and highlighting that global hegemons were late adopters); see also Ramirez
et al., supra note 109, at 737–38.
126. See David Strang, From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of
Decolonization 1870–1987, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 846, 847–48 (1990) (“By 1960 . . . decolonization
itself had delegitimated imperialism, as ex-dependencies . . . proclaimed the right of selfdetermination . . . .”); David Strang, Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500–1987, 35 INT’L
STUD. Q. 429, 442 (1991) (noting that “[p]rior decolonization . . . added to global understandings
of the legitimacy and inevitability of decolonization”).
127. Another approach might emphasize the rationality of mimicry as a signal to domestic
and international audiences—irrespective of whether the global script produces results on the
ground. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at S121
(attempting to reconcile rational choice theory with nations’ use of rhetoric and, in particular, to
explain why “self-interested nations would use moral and legal rhetoric, even though they are
not motivated by a desire to comply with moral or legal obligations”). Although the predictions
of this approach track our own in many respects, two points of disagreement bear mentioning.
First, the signaling story does not adequately account for isomorphism and decoupling.
Assuming that domestic and international audiences learn, the credibility of the mimicry signal
will substantially degrade over time in an environment characterized by decoupling. In other
words, the signaled audiences should learn that formal mimicry is often decoupled from
concrete change on the ground. As a consequence, the value of formal mimicry, without

GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC

654

8/12/2005 10:48 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:621

One remaining question is whether the conditions favorable to
acculturation are amenable to manipulation to promote change
through institutions. Drawing on institutional theories of the state, we
maintain that they are. First, significant empirical evidence shows that
increased institutionalization of a model at the global level is followed
128
by its diffusion across states. Second, the empirical research also
shows that a state’s degree of integration in world society is a strong
predictor of whether that state will adopt global cultural scripts.129
Accordingly, we submit that embedding target actors in social settings
organized around highly institutionalized, broadly shared principles
could foster the basic elements necessary for acculturation.130 Under
these conditions, states would likely value their status in the group
(“identify” with, or mimic, the group)—exploiting the cognitive and
social pressures described above.131
This evidence demonstrates, at a high level of generality, that
states respond to cultural forces. Less clear is how exactly this occurs.
The evidence described above does not document a specific causal
pathway by which culture influences state action. Although we
consider this issue an important one that requires rigorous empirical
testing, the claims made in this Article do not rely upon any particular
theory about how acculturation occurs. Our claims are not predicated
on a tacit theory of domestic political economy. Indeed, the empirical
record to date is consistent with a number of possible causal routes:
government representatives or high-level policymakers might be
directly acculturated;132 members of special interest groups might be
acculturated and they, in turn, might persuade domestic audiences (or

effective implementation, should erode over time. Second, this approach would predict that
mimicry (and, hence, isomorphism) would vary depending on the presence, power, and
influence of relevant audiences. Our approach, on the other hand, predicts isomorphism
irrespective of whether there is political pressure to conform. See generally Goodman & Jinks,
supra note 8.
128. Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 95, at 110–11.
129. Id. at 106; Meyer et al., World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980, supra note 96,
at 146.
130. This is a necessary predicate of acculturation in any meaningful sense. See, e.g.,
Johnston, supra note 5, at 501 (pointing out that the effectiveness of acculturation processes
“hinges . . . on an intersubjectively agreed upon notion of what socially valuable behavior looks
like”).
131. Id. at 506.
132. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 35, at 147 (considering the “impact of international
institutions on domestic (in this case foreign–policy related) agencies and actors”).
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political leaders) to adopt socially legitimated practices; or perhaps,
in some cases, relevant domestic audiences might be directly
acculturated by broader social forces, and these audiences, in turn,
might coerce (or persuade) their political leaders to comply with
social norms.134 We are, for the purposes of this Article, agnostic
about which of these theories best accounts for the observed behavior
of states. Irrespective of the specific causal pathway, we maintain that
observed state behavior is, to a nontrivial degree, the product of
acculturation. The following Parts also illustrate that fundamental
issues of institutional design turn on processes at this level of
abstraction.
TABLE 1. THREE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON STATES

Basis of
Influence

Coercion

Persuasion

Interest

Congruence with
values

Acculturation
Social expectations
Cultural identity
Social role

Behavioral
Logic

Instrumentalism

Active assessment of
the validity of a rule

Social status
Mimicry

Framing
Forms of
Influence

Material rewards
and punishment

Cuing to think
harder

Teaching

Cognitive costs and
benefits (orthodoxy,
dissonance)

Acceptance

Conformity

Convincing

Result

Compliance

Social rewards and
punishment (shaming,
shunning, back-patting)

In the balance of the Article, we analyze three regime design
problems in human rights law: (1) conditional membership in

133. See, e.g., Risse & Sikkink, supra note 24, at 5 (arguing that networks of domestic and
transnational actors “empower and legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups against
norm-violating governments”).
134. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 16–25 (describing this causal pathway in
context of human rights networks in Latin America).
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organizations, (2) precision of obligations, and (3) monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms. Two primary points follow from this
analysis. First, regime design principles for each issue vary
substantially across the identified behavioral logics. In short,
mechanisms matter for regime design. Second, the previously
undertheorized acculturation mechanism yields many regime design
recommendations that defy conventional wisdom in international law.
For example, the deinstitutionalizing effects of many traditional
“hard law” devices would, we claim, diminish the complianceinducing effects of acculturation. Our analysis of these regime design
problems is summarized in a table at the end of each Part.
II. CONDITIONAL MEMBERSHIP
An important choice in designing human rights regimes involves
deciding between an inclusive or restrictive membership rule in
multilateral organizations.135 Whether membership should be
conditioned on compliance with particular human rights standards is
the subject of an ongoing debate among governmental actors,
practitioners, and scholars. An inclusive approach would allow all
comers to join the organization and would place negligible conditions
on maintaining membership status. In contrast, a restrictive approach
would reject candidate states or expel member states that do not meet
particular human rights standards. For example, two supranational
organizations—the United Nations (U.N.)136 and the Council of
Europe137—have formally adopted a restrictive rule. The goals and
135. See Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55
INT’L ORG. 761, 770 (2001) (“Who belongs to the institution? Is membership exclusive and
restrictive, like the G-7’s limitation to rich countries? Or is it inclusive by design, like the
UN? . . . Membership has been one of the most hotly contested issues in recent years.”)
(emphasis omitted).
136. The U.N. Charter formally allows the organization to function in a restrictive manner,
but these powers have remained largely dormant in practice. Specific articles provide for the
exclusion of applicant states, see U.N. CHARTER art. 4, suspension of membership privileges, see
id. art. 5, and complete expulsion from the organization, see id. art. 6. Cf. LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COVENANT art. 1, para. 2 (providing for the exclusion of applicant states from the League of
Nations); id. art. 16, para. 4 (providing for expulsion from the League of Nations).
137. In 1993, the Council adopted a resolution essentially limiting the provision of observer
status to democratic states. See Observer Status, Eur. Comm. of Ministers, 92d Sess., Stat. Res.
(93) 26 (May 14, 1993), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/
Resol9326.htm. In 1994, the Council required applicant states to abolish the death penalty as a
precondition for full membership. Abolition of Capital Punishment, Eur. Parl. Ass., 25th Sitting,
Res. 1044 (Oct. 4, 1994), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/
ta94/ERES1044.htm. In 2001, the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution
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activities of these organizations include issues other than human
rights. Their membership rules, however, have inspired recent
proposals for human rights regimes. It is this debate—whether to
condition membership in exclusively human rights regimes on human
rights performance—that we consider in depth.
The two principal global human rights forums—international
human rights treaties138 and the U.N. Commission on Human
139
Rights —are currently modeled on an inclusive approach. Both
institutions formally allow the equal participation of liberal and
illiberal states. However, scholars suggest that the major international
human rights treaties should limit admission to states that already
comply with particular human rights standards and should expel
members that do not comply with terms of the treaty.140 These

“call[ing] into question the continuing Observer status of Japan and the United States with the
Organisation as a whole, should no significant progress” toward abolition of the death penalty
occur. See Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, Eur. Parl. Ass.,
17th Sitting, Res. 1253 (June 25, 2001), available at http://assembly.coe.int/documents/
adoptedtext/ta01/eres1253.htm.
138. There are six major international human rights treaties. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S.
195; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. 10020, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
139. The Commission on Human Rights is a suborgan of the U.N. General Assembly. Its
mandate includes developing standards for the elaboration and codification of international
human rights law and monitoring and reporting the human rights practices of U.N. member
states. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights, at
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrintro.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
140. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 4, at 2024 (“Countries might, for example, be required
to demonstrate compliance with certain human rights standards before being allowed to join a
human rights treaty. . . . Or treaties could include provisions for removing countries that are
habitually found in violation of the terms of the treaty from membership in the treaty regime.”);
see also Anne F. Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 229, 264 (Louis Henkin and John Lawrence Hargrove eds.,
1994), available in 26 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 264 (1994) (recommending “[p]utting
in place written rules for expelling from the treaty regime those states that do not adhere to a
set of minimum requirements drawn from the treaty’s implementation provisions”). These
restrictive approaches resemble proposals for excluding illiberal states from transnational legal
regimes. See Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter], Law Among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1990 (1992) (proposing
a new interpretation of the act-of-state doctrine by which “application of the doctrine to bar
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proposals have spurred an animated discussion within the academy.
They have also begun to gain political momentum within other
forums, in particular the Commission on Human Rights. A wide
range of actors—including government representatives,142 policy
analysts,143 activists,144 and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
145
for Human Rights —have recently supported the idea of excluding
states with poor human rights records from membership in the
Commission.
Importantly, formal membership rules do not exhaust the range
of choices confronting regime architects on this issue. States could, as
several historical examples illustrate, deploy other strategies when
existing organizational rules do not explicitly permit exclusion. As
Professor Louis Sohn explains in a leading article on expulsion from
multilateral organizations, “[a]ll these measures can be taken by
international organizations, whether or not their own constitutions
expressly provide for them. In fact, only on a few occasions were the
measures taken those actually authorized by explicit constitutional
adjudication of the validity of [an] act of a certain state would be a judicial declaration that the
state in question does not play by liberal rules”).
141. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into
Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 501, 502 (Philip
Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000); Philip Alston, Effective Functioning of Bodies Established
Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights Instruments: Final Report on Enhancing the LongTerm Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess.,
Agenda Item 15, ¶¶ 14–36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 4,
at 171–72; Hathaway, supra note 4, at 2020–25.
142. See, e.g., U.S. Mission to the European Union, U.S. Deeply Disappointed in Libya’s
Human Rights Election, at http://www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Jan2003UNUSLibya
HumanRights.html (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The United States will
continue to make its position clear. . . . We are convinced that the best way for the Commission
to ensure the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . is to have a membership
comprised of countries with strong human rights records at home.”) (quoting Ambassador
Kevin E. Moley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva)).
143. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, UN Human Rights Panel Needs Some Entry Standards, INT’L
HERALD TRIBUNE, May 14, 2003.
144. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, United Nations: Rights Commission Shields Abusers,
at http://hrw.org/press/2002/04/unhchrfinal.htm (Apr. 26, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“[A]ny government whose records the Commission has condemned, who have failed
to implement the Commission’s resolutions, or who have refused to allow visits by the
Commission’s investigators and experts, should be excluded from membership on the
commission.”).
145. Richard Waddington, Libya Elected to Chair U.N. Human Rights Body, REUTERS, Jan.
20, 2003 (“U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello has backed
activists’ calls for conditions to be agreed for Commission membership. These could include
signing and ratifying all human rights treaties and inviting U.N. special rights investigators to
visit.”).
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146
provisions.” Indeed, states have deployed a range of tactics to limit
the participation of governments with offensive human rights
practices, including denying access to regional and preparatory
meetings,147 rejecting credentials required for participation,148 limiting
voting or speaking rights,149 and adopting extraordinary resolutions
tantamount to expulsion (e.g., “advising” a member state to
150
withdraw). These measures often serve as the functional equivalent
of formal conditions on membership. Although we discuss only
formal membership rules, our analysis generally applies to these
informal measures as well.151
Before we proceed to that analysis, it is also important to note
that other design features may raise some, though not all, of the
same considerations. First, procedural or substantive terms of a treaty
may produce significant exclusionary effects. It is well
understood that higher standards in a human rights treaty tend to
reduce levels of state participation. For instance, in drafting the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court, negotiators adopted
strong procedural and substantive provisions that effectively
152
sacrificed the participation of particular governments. As other

146. Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1421 (1964).
147. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 71–72 (discussing measures involving the
Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and South
Africa).
148. See, e.g., id. at 74 (discussing the World Meteorological Organization’s rejection of
South Africa’s credentials); Sohn, supra note 146, at 1401–04 (discussing the exclusion of Spain
from several U.N. specialized agencies).
149. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 71–72 (discussing the World Health Organization
and South Africa).
150. See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (discussing the Organization of American States and Cuba); id. at
71 (discussing the International Labor Organization and South Africa); Sohn, supra note 146, at
1409–12 (discussing the Economic and Social Council and Portugal).
151. Aspects of our discussion also apply to strategies by which individual governments and
nongovernmental organizations might encourage illiberal states to join human rights regimes.
For example, governments and organizations should consider the institutionalizing effects of
universal membership in determining whether to emphasize the strategy of pressuring illiberal
states to ratify human rights treaties. Similarly, an understanding of these effects should inform
decisions about whether to pressure illiberal states to leave international organizations (e.g.,
African states’ boycotting intergovernmental organizations that allowed South African
participation). See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 71, 73 (discussing several African
countries’ threats to boycott the United Postal Union.).
152. See, e.g., Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the
Struggle for the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85
(Sarah B. Sewell & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000); Trigger Mechanisms and Accountability, 10 INT’L
CRIM. CT. MONITOR (NGO Coalition for an Int’l Criminal Court, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 1998,
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153
these design choices may be
commentators demonstrate,
understood as membership rules.
Second, administrative rules applied in the course of managing a
human rights regime may also implicate the scope of membership.
Consider, for example, the controversy over the appropriate remedy
for invalid treaty reservations.154 Proposals include severing the
reservation and thus keeping the state bound to the treaty, or
155
nullifying the entire act of ratification. Although this debate is
complex, the effect of each proposal on treaty membership weighs
heavily in any systematic evaluation of these options.156 Indeed, the
very idea that some reservations should be deemed invalid is justified
as the best way to promote universal membership without sacrificing
the integrity of the underlying treaty norms.157 Another administrative
question concerns the criteria used for accreditation of governmental

at 5 (discussing the history of the negotiations at the treaty conference), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/publications/monitor/10/monitor10.199811.pdf.
153. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 429 (2000) (describing the use of hard law as functionally “an
ex ante sorting device”); George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of International
Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 500 &
n.123 (2000) (analyzing stronger obligations as effectively a restrictive membership approach in
environment, trade, and arms control agreements).
154. A reservation is a formal condition that a state makes when ratifying a treaty, whereby
the state purports to exclude or modify its obligations under the treaty. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333.
Commentators hold a range of opinions on the subject of severing invalid reservations. See
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 399, 402 (2000) (rejecting severability and challenging the “conventional
academic wisdom concerning both the legality and desirability of [reservations, understandings,
and declarations] attached to human rights treaties” and arguing that reservations “reflect a
sensible accommodation of competing domestic and international considerations”); Ryan
Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.
531, 531 (2002) (advocating for the severability of certain treaty reservations, but noting strong
opposition to this position by a number of commentators); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile
Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 509–11 (2002) (discussing the
severability of the United States’ juvenile death penalty reservation to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Catherine Redgwell, US Reservations to Human Rights
Treaties: All for One and None for All?, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392, 399–400 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds.,
2003) (discussing possible responses to U.S. reservations to human rights treaties).
155. Goodman, supra note 154, at 531; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 154, at 438.
156. The selected remedy will also affect whether some states are willing to consent to
human rights treaties in the first place. See Goodman, supra note 154, at 535–55.
157. See Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) (noting the traditional rule
considering reservations to multilateral treaties invalid unless accepted by all parties).
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delegations in international forums—for example, whether to seat a
democratically elected government in exile or a nondemocratic
158
government with effective control of a country. Again, this is a
thorny problem, but deciding which approach is optimal will turn, in
part, on the expected functions of membership rules and the effect
desired from exclusion.159 The important point is that an empirical
question inheres in these doctrinal problems: what are the
consequences of restrictive membership? The following discussion
examines the empirical foundations of membership rules. For the
sake of clarity, we focus on rules that directly restrict—either through
denial of admission or through expulsion—membership on the basis
of human rights performance.
Our analysis of the three mechanisms of social influence is
relevant to the debate over conditional membership in several
respects. First, the social mechanism that one emphasizes (or tries to
harness) might dictate whether and how to condition membership.
Second, close attention to social processes clarifies the trade-offs that
would accompany specific membership rules. Third, the social
mechanism that one emphasizes also implicates various second-order
determinations. For example, if one adopted a restrictive approach,
each of the mechanisms would suggest unique design principles with
respect to the substantive criteria and procedures for selecting,
retaining, or ousting members.
A. Coercion
Coercion suggests two approaches to the restrictive membership
issue. On one view, whether states act within or outside a regime
should not substantially affect the ability of stronger states to exert
influence over delinquent, weaker states.160 Another view is that high

158. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J.
INT’L L. 539, 605 (1992).
159. Inclusion of the de facto (but illegitimate) government signals acceptance of its
authority—and perhaps imbues it with some measure of legitimacy. See id. Exclusion, on the
other hand, might sacrifice some measure of influence over nondemocratic governments. Id. at
605–06 (evaluating the claim that the General Assembly’s use of its accreditation power to
recognize democratically elected governments would cause it to “lose any leverage it might have
to influence the policies of excluded unelected governments”).
160. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT’L
SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5, 7 (“[International] institutions have minimal influence on state
behavior . . . .”); see also Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 486–87 (1988).
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levels of regime participation can yield nontrivial benefits: regimes
help generate information about the distribution of state preferences,
develop reputations for compliance, and lower the transaction costs
161
These effects promote stable cooperative
of cooperation.
arrangements in part because they facilitate the efficient allocation of
162
rewards and penalties.
The benefits of inclusion, however, must be weighed against the
benefits of a restrictive rule. Restrictive membership might yield two
advantages for effective coercion. First, conditioning admission on
performance has an information-forcing effect. Several leading
commentators accordingly hypothesize that rational regime designers
are more likely to adopt a restrictive membership rule under
conditions of uncertainty about state preferences: “Membership
enables states to learn about each others’ preferences if the
membership mechanism can distinguish cooperators from noncooperators. . . . Effective membership rules create a separating
equilibrium where only those who share certain characteristics will
163
bear the costs necessary to be included in an equilibrium.”
Assuming that such information is valued, rational regime designers
should weigh (1) the information produced by a high admissions bar
against (2) the information produced by lowering the bar (i.e.,

161. KEOHANE, supra note 28, at 244–45; Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The
Promise of Institutionalist Theory, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1995, 39, 46–50. In accordance with
this neoinstitutionalist view, a regime should emphasize measures such as reporting
requirements and repeat interactions to help develop reputations.
162. We have isolated the different causal mechanisms for theoretical reasons explained
above. See supra Part I. Note, however, that, if legitimacy is also an empirically meaningful
variable, inclusive membership may bolster the effectiveness of coercive power. Specifically,
some scholars who argue for the coercion paradigm (for example, some neorealists) accept that
legitimacy is a component of power. On this view, the use of sanctions against a state that
violates human rights may be more legitimate, and thus more effective, if the target state has
formally acceded to the relevant human rights obligations.
163. Koremenos et al., supra note 135, at 784; see also id. (“When the price of membership is
too low, membership is not informative.”); Barbara Koremenos et al., Rational Design: Looking
Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051, 1056–57 (2001) (discussing results of contributions
to the special issue that support this conjecture); cf. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 429
(“[S]tates should find hard law of special value when forming ‘clubs’ of sincerely committed
states . . . . Here legalization functions as an ex ante sorting device: because hard legal
commitments impose greater costs on violators, a willingness to make them identifies one as
having a low propensity to defect.”).
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allowing more states to participate in the intraregime organizational
164
processes that generate information over time).
Second, restricting membership to states with better human
rights records might facilitate deep cooperation among regime
participants. Professor George Downs et al. define the depth of an
agreement as “the extent to which [the agreement] requires states to
depart from what they would have done in its absence.”165 These
scholars stress the utility of coercive tools in ensuring cooperation
166
among states, and they contend that only states strongly committed
to regime principles would ratify treaties requiring deep change.167
Naturally, they conclude that cooperative international regimes
should restrict membership to states that are prepared to undertake
substantial obligations.168 It is unclear, however, whether this
reasoning applies to human rights treaties because Professor Downs
et. al. developed the theory in the context of environmental regimes.
As we describe in the Introduction, human rights regimes do not fit
neatly into cooperative models—there is no clear “free rider”
problem, and states can, in a nontrivial sense, ensure human rights
domestically without the cooperation of other states.169 As a

164. After one weighs the benefits of inclusion with the benefits of a restrictive rule, it
becomes difficult to see why a rational institutional designer would invariably, or at least
usually, favor restrictive membership under conditions of uncertainty.
165. George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996); see also Guzman, supra note 6, at 1854–57.
166. Downs et al., supra note 165, at 386, 391.
167. See, e.g., id. at 399:
One possible strategy is to restrict regime membership to states that will not have to
defect very often. The idea is that whatever benefit is lost by excluding such states
from the regime will be more than made up by permitting those that are included to
set and also enforce a deeper level of cooperation . . . .
168. Cf. Downs et al., supra note 153, at 508:
[T]he maximum amount of cooperation is likely to be achieved through the creation
of a noninclusive regime that contains a majority of the most cooperatively
progressive states. Such regimes tend to establish an initial level of cooperation that is
relatively deep, whereas a more inclusive regime in which the average state had yet to
be affected . . . would do little or nothing.
169. One might incorrectly think that Professor Downs et al.’s analysis equally applies to
human rights. Professor Downs et al. do apply their argument to environmental regimes, see id.,
and, at first blush, the environmental context may appear to raise the same concerns as human
rights: the states least willing to control environmental degradation would be omitted from a
restrictive regime. However, this is not necessarily the case. In the environmental context, the
states more willing to join a restrictive regime (“cooperatively progressive” states) may also be
the states with greater environmental problems (or there may be no association between
degrading the environment and being a cooperatively progressive state). However, when
outsiders are the ones most likely to exhibit the problem (environmental degradation, human
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consequence, the types of costs identified by Professor Downs et al.
(i.e., increased free riding and the emergence of suboptimal focal
points) are negligible in the human rights context.
An additional feature of human rights regimes mitigates the
concern that breadth trades off with depth. Because human rights
protection does not require a unified institutional framework, there
170
are multiple, overlapping human rights treaty regimes. There are no
fewer than four international human rights regimes: the global regime
(embodied in the U.N. system and the “International Bill of Rights”
treaties)171 and three regional systems.172 As a result, states can pursue
multiple cooperative strategies simultaneously, and the membership
rules of each regime can be tailored to the specific goals of the treaty
system in question. Assume, for the sake of argument, that human
rights treaties solve some collective action problems—an assumption
that makes plausible Professor Down’s analysis. Liberal states
committed to “deep” cooperation on human rights issues could
jointly pursue multiple objectives. To capture the benefits of
cooperation, such states could establish a separate treaty regime with
(1) robust substantive commitments and (2) restricted membership.
To capture the “noncooperative” benefits of constructive
engagement, these states could also pursue a global regime with (1)
more modest substantive commitments and (2) unrestricted
membership.173
rights abuses, etc.), Professor Downs et al.’s argument is less persuasive. Cf. Downs et al., supra
note 165, at 399 (“The idea is that whatever benefit is lost by excluding such states from the
regime will be more than made up by permitting those that are included to set and also enforce
a deeper level of cooperation . . . .”).
170. Overlapping, inconsistent rights regimes can coexist because the regulatory problem
that they address is unidirectional. That is, rights regimes seek to maximize the protection of
individual rights—subject only to the other necessities of good governance. Rights regimes
regulate only underprotection of rights, not their overprotection. Consider a stylized example.
Assume that regime X protects rights at level ten and regime Y protects rights at level five. All
states willing to protect rights at level ten could lawfully participate in both regimes.
171. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 138, S. EXEC. DOC. E,
95-2, at 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 331; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 138, 993 U.N.T.S. at 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
172. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
173. This is an important point because it goes a long way toward dispelling one potential
problem with our model. As we note in the Introduction, one purpose of international human
rights regimes is to improve the practices of illiberal states. There are, however, other important
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If a restrictive approach were adopted, the coercion mechanism
would suggest particular procedures for applying the membership
rule. Specifically, it would make sense to design the admission process
to yield particular types of information. The regime might, for
example, target information otherwise difficult to detect. Candidate
states could be required to provide information on death in custody
174
or statistics on racially disparate social conditions. The important
point is that the analysis of mechanisms informs not only the decision
of whether to adopt a restrictive rule but also the determination of
the most effective means of administering the selected rule.
B. Persuasion
Properly considered, persuasion—like coercion—can and does
occur outside international organizations.175 Treaty regimes do accord,
however, some structural opportunities for persuasion. Moreover,
international human rights regimes help liberal states coordinate their
efforts at persuasive diplomacy. Typically, commentators who
emphasize the value of persuasion also suggest that membership

objectives of human rights regimes. For example, international rights regimes might empower
national governments to “lock in” elevated levels of rights protection—allowing national
leaders to consolidate gains in liberalization and democratization. See Moravcsik, supra note 12,
at 220 (stating that “governments turn to international enforcement when an international
commitment effectively enforces the policy preferences of a particular government at a
particular point in time against future domestic political alternatives”). As the discussion in the
text suggests, these goals can be pursued within the context of a regional regime—or a regime
organized around some other salient state characteristic. Indeed, Professor Moravcsik’s
important study documents how some national governments utilized the European human
rights regime for this purpose. See id. at 243 (stating that the origins of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms “lie in selfinterested efforts by newly established (or reestablished) democracies”).
174. U.N. monitoring bodies have had difficulty acquiring this type of information. See,
e.g., Michael Banton, The Causes of, and Remedies for, Racial Discrimination, U.N.
ESCOR Comm. on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.1/BP.6 (1999)
(explaining difficulties in obtaining data from governments on dimensions of racial
discrimination), available at http: www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a0a298536f43dc
51802567a5005a1d09?Opendocument.
175. Some commentators may overestimate the importance of treaty regimes for persuasion.
See Downs et al., supra note 153, at 495–97 (criticizing scholars for trumpeting processes of
persuasion within international organizations without considering alternative opportunities for
persuasion in the wider context). But cf. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 1–38 (describing
transnational processes of persuasion, including but not limited to formal organizations); Koh,
supra note 4, at 2656–58 (describing multiple forums and processes apart from international
organizations); Raustiala, supra note 7, at 10–16 (analyzing the importance of networks outside
formal organizations and treaties).
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176
should be inclusive. Broad treaty membership, on this view, would
lower transaction costs and facilitate opportunities for collective
deliberation and dialogue. The primary advantage of unrestricted
membership is that it enmeshes illiberal states in regularized
communicative processes.177 In addition, the interdisciplinary
“communicative action” literature suggests that open debate and
constructive dialogue would push states toward a progressive
realization of human rights.178 Under this approach, restrictive
membership rules risk deinstitutionalization by foregrounding
disagreements without providing a constructive institutional setting in
which these disagreements could be debated.179 These commentators
often perceive restrictive rules as crude punitive measures. Professors
Chayes and Chayes, for example, classify restrictive membership rules
exclusively within the rubric of “sanctions.”180 Similarly, Professor
Rodger Payne contends that measures implying “participant rank”
introduce a wholly undesirable “warping factor” into persuasive
settings.181 The argument for inclusiveness in this literature, however,
is often based on the theory that broad-based membership will exert
stronger and more authoritative “community pressure” on
recalcitrant states.182 Such a proposition describes (within the four
corners of our model) the mechanism of acculturation, which involves
a different set of assumptions and implications.
On the other hand, the mechanics of persuasion suggest some
nontrivial advantages of restricted membership. For example,
exclusion of illiberal states from human rights regimes can promote
issue salience in those states. This increased salience empowers

176. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2002); Downs et al., supra note 153, at 477–78 (describing the literature);
see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 68–69.
177. Of course, the nature of the forum would need to foster these types of interactions.
178. Risse, supra note 33, at 2; cf. Reus-Smit, supra note 24, at 526.
179. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 69 (“[D]isputes about membership necessarily
imposed costs in terms of regime performance . . . .”); id. at 85 (“The very effort to impose
sanctions [through membership status], even when it is successful, turns into a major issue,
disrupts the work of the organization and generates dissatisfaction and resentment among
supporters as well as opponents of the action.”); cf. Payne, supra note 7, at 41–42 (borrowing
from Jürgen Habermas in discussing the noxious effects of using coercive tools with ongoing
processes of persuasion).
180. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 68–87.
181. Payne, supra note 7, at 47.
182. See, e.g., BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 176, at 175 (“These are institutions in
which community pressure is arguably at its strongest because of their broadly drawn
membership . . . .”).
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human rights advocacy networks to shape the local political agenda
by alerting local actors to these issues and exposing inconsistencies in
183
national priorities. The important point is that “negative” events—
such as exclusion or expulsion from a human rights regime—can
inspire the mobilization of social movements.184
If a restrictive approach were adopted, the mechanics of
persuasion would also suggest how best to make membership
determinations. The process initiated by such a membership regime
would provide multiple opportunities for framing human rights issues.
For example, membership criteria (and the negotiations that they
trigger) might target issues, such as indigenous rights or the legality of
extraterritorial human rights violations, that might not have received
adequate attention on the international stage. The important
comparative point is that this negotiating process—which the
coercion approach simply dismisses as transaction costs185—is, in the
persuasion approach, an advantage in that it provides structural
opportunities for productive exchange and teaching.
C. Acculturation
Unlike the other two approaches, the acculturation mechanism
suggests that membership rules are of high importance in regime
design. According to this view, broad membership would amplify
social pressure and help substantiate the claim that the principled
commitments of the regime are, indeed, universal. Moreover, one of
the principal empirical insights of acculturation studies is that the
degree to which states are embedded in international organizations is
strongly associated with the state’s conformity to global models of
appropriate behavior.186 Participation in international institutions thus
183.
184.

KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 24–27.
William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES,
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 275 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996).
For example, the European Union’s denial of Turkey’s application for admission might assist
domestic human rights movements in promoting long-term reforms.
185. Our point here is simply that coercion does not value highly the negotiating process
itself.
186. Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 328–30 (1996); see Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 173
(“[W]orld-society models shape nation-state identities, structures, and behavior via worldwide
cultural and associational processes.”); see also supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text
(discussing the correlation between states’ international involvement and their adoption of
global norms).
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plays a significant role in promoting standardized, socially legitimated
187
models of appropriate state behavior. Importantly, institutions with
broad membership advance the social processes by which states adopt
188
norms identified with being a “modern state.” Accordingly, the
mechanism of acculturation—unlike coercion and persuasion—
operates much more effectively, and sometimes necessarily, through
international organizations.
Acculturation suggests several additional benefits of inclusive
membership worth mentioning. First, inclusive membership
encourages illiberal states to define and justify their resistance to
global norms in terms of the treaty. To guard against retrenchment,
for example, disputes over rights protection should occur within the
terms of global models of legitimate state objectives. In practice,
human rights treaties often contain provisions that delineate
acceptable governmental restrictions on particular rights, such as
189
derogation and limitation clauses. The inclusion of illiberal states
within these frameworks should facilitate the institutionalization of
globally legitimated restrictions. Exclusion, on the other hand, may
encourage parochial or idiosyncratic modes of resistance to human
rights norms. Escape clauses (such as derogation and limitation
clauses) both encourage state participation in human rights regimes
and increase the acceptability of various institutionalized forms of
state reporting and third-party evaluation. Moreover, states can—
through the use of these devices—meaningfully participate in a treaty

187. FINNEMORE, supra note 34, at 3; Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics,
Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 712–15 (1999).
188. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 INT’L
ORG. 565, 566, 583–87 (1993) (concluding that the efforts of UNESCO prompted the creation of
national science bureaucracies in many countries).
189. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 138, art. 4(1),
999 U.N.T.S. at 174 (“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation . . . .”); American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 172, art. 15, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149:
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed
in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of
national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals
or the rights or freedom of others.
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regime because many state interests (even if idiosyncratic or highly
190
controversial) can be expressed within the terms of the treaty.
Second, the logic of acculturation, in contrast to the logic of the
other mechanisms,191 highlights the importance of discouraging certain
relationships that can arise between organizational insiders and
outsiders. As a model of culture, acculturation predicts the
institutionalization of deviance within subcultures that can form
among outsiders who have been denied access to the dominant
group.192 Indeed, acculturation studies explain variation among states
by showing that adherence to dominant norms is associated with
193
levels of participation in international organizations. Thus, states
with fewer connections to international bodies (e.g., Burma and
North Korea) should be more prone to adopt aberrant official
policies and forms of governance. Furthermore, the forces of social
pressure and orthodoxy that occur within global institutions can also
occur within smaller communities—e.g., Asia-Pacific states with low
participation in international human rights forums—thus propelling
local standards partly defined in contradistinction to global
conventions.
The acculturation approach differs from the other approaches in
how it evaluates “defections” by states inside the organization. First,
an acculturation approach predicts certain patterns of defection not
envisioned by the other approaches, and it thus evaluates the cost of
defection for regime maintenance very differently. The coercion
approach, for example, raises the concern that including states with
lower commitments to regime objectives will prove unworkable due

190. This suggests an important, and potentially problematic, difference between the
mechanics of acculturation and persuasion. The acculturation approach is agnostic about the
“truth-finding” capacities of social interaction. Under the persuasion approach, on the other
hand, “communicative action” theory suggests (either expressly or impliedly) that greater rights
protections will emerge from well-structured discourse among states. See Downs et al., supra
note 153, at 474 (explaining that this area of scholarship appears to consider a set of prescribed
processes “relentlessly progressive”). The acculturation model instead emphasizes cultural and
associational factors that shape the definition and mediate the transmission of socially accepted
behavior.
191. Recall that, under the coercion and persuasion approaches, gains to insiders are largely
absolute and localized; these approaches do not impose costs on outsiders. The organizational
benefits to insiders do not affect the relationships between insiders and outsiders or the impact
of exclusion on outsiders’ attitudes or behavior.
192. See generally HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE (1963) (describing the processes of subculture formation among outsiders).
193. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between
states’ international involvement and their adoption of global norms).
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194
to frequent defection within the forum. The persuasion approach
predicts that few meaningful defections will occur and considers
195
defection in unequivocally unfavorable terms. An acculturation
approach, in contrast, predicts that defections will occur and may be
somewhat salutary. Specifically, it predicts that pressure to conform
will produce a particular form of defection: decoupling, in which
structural adherence to globally institutionalized models does not
correspond to actual state practices on the ground.196 As we argue
elsewhere, this disconnect between local circumstances and universal
models is not an impediment to the diffusion of global norms, as
other theories would suggest.197 Rather, this form of decoupling, in
important respects, makes possible the diffusion of global models and
the resultant convergence of policies and organizational structures.
The important points here are that the acculturation mechanism
predicts a peculiar form of defection and that this form of defection
assists the diffusion of norms.
The mechanics of acculturation also suggest potential advantages
to a restrictive rule. First, membership itself can serve as a device for
affirmation or censure. That is, inclusion can provide a form of backpatting, whereas exclusion can shame and shun. In a related context,
Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter advocates calibrating the application of
doctrines of judicial deference to different forms of government. She
proposes that national courts exercise jurisdiction over the acts of
liberal foreign states but abstain from reviewing the acts of illiberal
198
ones. Dean Slaughter contends that shielding illiberal states from
judicial scrutiny entails “salving their sovereign sensitivities, but at the
199
price of . . . moral ostracism from the liberal community.” Indeed,
her proposal is designed to confer a “badge of alienage” on illiberal

194. See Downs et al., supra note 165, at 398–99 (discussing “why many deeply cooperative
regimes have a limited number of members and why regimes with a large number of members
tend to engage in only shallow cooperation”).
195. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 543 (discussing the theory that states
develop a “sense of obligation” and that “[w]hile instances of non-compliance clearly occur . . .
they are generally inadvertent”); cf. Downs et al., supra note 165, at 379–80 (criticizing this
prediction of compliance).
196. See supra Part I.C.4.
197. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1761.
198. See Burley, supra note 140, at 1916–23 (contending that domestic courts’ divergent
treatment of liberal and illiberal foreign states would create a “zone of law” in relation to liberal
states and a “zone of politics” in relation to illiberal states).
199. Id. at 1991.
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200
states and a “badge of legitimacy” on liberal states. Although
substantial empirical evidence now suggests that these categories are
socially meaningful, Dean Slaughter does not consider countervailing
effects within the terms of the same social logic. That is, the same
body of empirical work provides strong reasons for bringing
recalcitrant states into the fold. Specifically, as discussed above,
processes of assimilation suggest that illiberal states will begin to
imitate the group in which they are included.201 This “identification”
with a group—not banishment from the group—is perhaps more
likely to propel the legal and political systems of illiberal states
toward conformity with prevailing norms.202
Second, the acculturation approach suggests that restrictive
membership might foster greater affinity among insiders—thus
accelerating processes of norm diffusion within a group. The social
meaning of exclusivity—created by the restriction itself—should
intensify forms of identification. And, if the substantive criteria for
membership include human rights performance, identification is
likely to develop along the axis of that defining criterion. However,
such dynamics improve the situation only for states willing and able
to join an organization. Although we discussed a similar difficulty
with the coercion approach (in which gains only accrue to insiders),203
this result is especially problematic in the context of acculturation.
Widening disparities between insiders and outsiders might culminate
in standards that are unrealistically high for illiberal states,
diminishing substantially the probability that these states will identify
with insiders.
Finally, substantial evidence from social psychology suggests that
small groups often facilitate processes of acculturation. The literature
often describes this effect as “persuasion,” but the mechanics of this
204
social process mirror what we call “acculturation.” In discussing
international institutions, for example, Professor Iain Johnston notes
that “ideal persuasion is likely to be the most prevalent and powerful

200. Id. at 1990–92.
201. See supra Part I.C.1.
202. As we note above, Dean Slaughter’s project on transgovernmentalism relies centrally
on notions of persuasion. See supra note 7.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 165–73 (explaining that, under the coercion
approach, restrictive membership facilitates deeper cooperation among insiders only).
204. This is yet another important example of the literature’s conceptual slippage along the
persuasion/acculturation divide. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25 (describing this
conceptual slippage at an abstract level).
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socialization process when membership is small (social liking and ingroup identity effects on the persuasiveness of counterattitudinal
205
messages are strongest).” Notwithstanding the persuasion label, this
view clearly suggests that small group size promotes acculturation
because small groups are more likely to foster intimate, high-affect
exchanges.206 Regimes with restricted membership, therefore, should
facilitate the convergence of practices.207 The degree to which this
insight is applicable to human rights treaty regimes, however, is
questionable. The identified advantages issue only from the size of
the group. As such, the social psychology literature is nonspecific and
offers no guidance on any other defining characteristic of
membership regimes. For example, the “small-group” effect does not
necessarily support the view that regime members should be selected
on the basis of human rights performance; in fact, if it did,
acculturation would prove most effective when needed least—in the
case of high performance states. In addition, persuasive encounters—
such as bilateral or trilateral diplomatic exchanges—may occur in
small-group settings irrespective of the size of the treaty regime writ
large.
On balance, the features of acculturation support inclusive
membership. However, if a restrictive rule were adopted, the
principles of acculturation would favor particular criteria in applying
the rule. First, the acculturation approach would suggest requiring
only a de minimis demonstration of human rights performance.
Second, qualifying criteria for new entrants might be used to
encourage candidate states to establish institutional arrangements
fostering subsequent structural opportunities for the diffusion of
global norms. The acculturation literature suggests that particular

205. Johnston, supra note 5, at 509.
206. In other words, this design feature—small groups—induces social conformity through
affiliation and identification with other participants, not through deliberation on the content of
the exchange. Just as it is possible that such affiliation and identification could set the stage for
more effective persuasion, so might the tools of coercion set the stage for more effective
persuasion. The important point is not to commit the conceptual error of confusing the tools
that set the stage from activities that then take place on the stage.
207. Professor Johnston risks the same framing error that we discuss with respect to the
coercion paradigm. See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text. That is, focusing on
institutional effectiveness in this manner displaces the wider regime and has implications for
excluded states. An exclusionary organization may enhance the social environment for insiders.
But, especially with respect to human rights, one should weigh the advantages of significantly
enhanced effectiveness for member states against the advantages of lowering the bar and
allowing more states to benefit from—overall less effective—participation.
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domestic arrangements can (unintentionally) accelerate diffusion by
208
providing “domestic receptor sites” for international norms. For
example, Professor David John Frank et al. show that domestic
natural science associations and environmental institutes facilitate the
local transmission of global models of environmentalism.209 In the
context of international human rights, national human rights
210
Hence, admission to the
commissions are a close analogue.
intergovernmental organization might be conditioned on (or highly
favor) establishing such national institutions. In a similar vein, an
intergovernmental organization could require or encourage candidate
states to establish a human rights ombudsman or a human rights unit
in the foreign ministry to interface with the international
organization. The basic idea would be to promote institutional
arrangements that, according to the behavioral logic of acculturation,
should produce a multiplier effect in the transmission and diffusion of
human rights norms.

208. Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 95, at 96 n.1 (“Receptor sites are social
structures (e.g., scientific institutes) with the capacity to receive, decode, and transmit signals
from the world society to national actors.”); see also Frank et al., Environmentalism, supra note
95, at 123–24 (discussing the diffusion of international environmental norms through “scientific
receptor sites”).
209. Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 95, at 105–09.
210. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AND OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL
EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000).
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TABLE 2: CONDITIONAL MEMBERSHIP
Inclusive
1. Repeat interactions increase information
2. Repeat interactions decrease cheating (by
fostering future gains and developing
reputations for compliance)

Coercion

3. The institutional setting decreases the
transaction costs of gaining information and
making agreements
4. The process of reviewing membership
involves transaction costs
Note: A reason for inclusiveness exists if the
size of membership increases the amount of
rewards and penalties for members212

211

Restrictive
1. Membership rules are
information-forcing devices
that reveal states’
willingness and capacity to
join an organization213
2. Smaller membership
involves lower transaction
costs in the management of
an organization (but
benefits accrue only to
liberal states inside the
organization)

1. Inclusion promotes opportunities for
discussion, argument, and debate
Persuasion

2. Inclusion lowers the transaction costs of
collective communication and exchange

Exclusion increases issue
salience (e.g., with domestic
audiences)

3. The process of applying membership rules
undermines a deliberative atmosphere
1. Inclusion produces strong social effects on
insiders (i.e., embeddedness in regimes
promotes conformity)
2. Inclusion regulates forms of resistance
3. Inclusion avoids creating a subculture of
outsiders
Acculturation

4. Inclusion promotes a message of
universality in norm enunciation
5. Larger membership maximizes social
pressure (cumulative effect for back-patting
and shaming)
Risk: A high prevalence of violations among
insiders risks institutionalizing undesirable
behavior

1. Membership itself is a
device for conferring
legitimacy and ostracizing
outsiders affinity among
insiders
2. Membership rule
strengthens affinity among
members.
3. The process of reviewing
membership has
institutionalizing benefits

211. These conclusions rely on two assumptions: (1) that the regime has sufficiently high
human rights standards and (2) that one of the participants’ principal concerns is to change the
behavior of governments engaged in frequent and severe human rights violations.
212. Also, issue linkage within a regime (linking human rights compliance with material
rewards or penalties) would provide a stronger reason for a more inclusive rule.
213. If issue linkage includes rewards for mere membership, a stronger reason exists for a
restrictive rule.
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III. PRECISION OF OBLIGATIONS
Another important choice in human rights regime design
214
concerns the level of precision with which obligations are defined.
Scholars consider “precision and elaboration . . . especially significant
215
hallmarks of legalization at the international level.” The issue of
precision has accordingly become a prominent topic in the study of
international institutions.216 Like the debate over legal formalism in
217
domestic law, these debates in international law persist without an
adequate understanding of the connection between prescriptive
claims and empirical assumptions. Commentators argue for—or
against—precision without due regard for the manner in which their
ostensibly normative claims are tethered to undefended or
unexamined empirical propositions.
Consider, for example, the debates about whether treaties or
customary international law provides a better vehicle for regulating
state practice. As Professor David Kennedy remarks in a more critical
voice, “Are international norms best built by custom or treaty?
International lawyers have worried about this for at least a century,
one or the other mode coming in and out of fashion at various
points.”218 Professor Kennedy suggests that these debates repeat
themselves across generations of international legal scholars without
moving matters forward. One reason for this repetition without
progression may be the failure to specify and trace the significance of
relevant behavioral logics. For example, according to some
214. We use a standard definition of precision: “Precision means that rules unambiguously
define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe.” Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000); see also id. at 412 (“A precise rule
specifies clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state or other actor (in terms of both
the intended objective and the means of achieving it) in a particular set of circumstances. In
other words, precision narrows the scope for reasonable interpretation.”).
215. Id. at 414.
216. For example, in 2000, International Organization—the leading international relations
journal—devoted a special issue to the topic of legalization. The authors of the volume identity
“precision” as one of three characteristics for evaluating the concept of legalization across
international institutions. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,
54 INT’L ORG. 385, 387 (2000). Issues of “determinacy” figure prominently in Professor Thomas
Franck’s influential study of international legal compliance. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra
note 7, at 50–90.
217. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636,
650–69 (1999) (discussing the empirical dimensions of disputes regarding domestic legal
formalism).
218. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 335, 352 (2000).
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commentators, treaties are better devices for regulating state
behavior because they generally provide a level of specification that is
219
difficult to obtain through custom. However, without empirical
support, that assessment is largely conjecture. To test the assessment,
it would be necessary to know whether, how, and under what
conditions normative and legal precision actually influences state
behavior. And it would be important to identify gaps in empirical
information that must be filled to assess adequately the social effects
of precision. It would also be important to discover whether states are
likely under certain conditions to try to obfuscate their human rights
obligations, to evaluate obligations deliberatively, or to mimic
obligations.
The language used to define obligations in human rights treaties
is notoriously vague compared with the language used in other legal
220
domains. A common view is that human rights treaties should aspire
to greater levels of precision to foster compliance and enforcement.221
Other commentators caution, however, that ambiguity can help build
222
consensus in the treaty-drafting process. The issue of precision
should thus be evaluated along two dimensions: ex ante effects on
legislative processes and ex post effects on compliance. The following
discussion analyzes the issue along those lines.

219. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 66
(1991) (“It is easy to see the advantages of that process. . . . In place of the uncertain and slow
process of custom, . . . [t]he text brings clarity and precision where there had been obscurity and
doubt.”); id. at 71 (theorizing a “bureaucratic factor” that encourages the application of treaties
because “[t]he law is declared in a concise and definitive form that is highly convenient for
lawyers and officials”); Guzman, supra note 6, at 1876 (“Because CIL’s [customary international
law’s] content is uncertain, states can often claim to have complied even when they have ignored
the content of CIL. In other words, the commitment to CIL is more easily avoided than the
commitment to a treaty.”); id. at 1877 (“Problems of clarity and a lack of explicit commitment
on the part of states make CIL weaker than treaties.”).
220. Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvian Vité, International Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights Law, 293 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 94, 106 (1993) (“[T]he major difficulty of applying
human rights law as enunciated in the treaties is the very general nature of the treaty
language.”).
221. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
371, 378 (1988) (remarks of Bruno Simma):
What I have just said will be feasible, however, only if and to the degree that human
rights treaty provisions are actually susceptible to violations in the sense that
infringements of treaty provisions can be determined clearly. . . . Indeed,
international human rights treaties are not notorious for the precision of their
wording; they contain many vague and ambiguous provisions . . . . It will not be easy
to localize clear-cut violations of such provisions . . . .
222. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 11; FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7,
at 52–53; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 434, 444–45.
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A. Coercion
According to the coercion approach, precision offers a number of
advantages. A general assumption of the approach is that states act to
maximize their own material well-being. Precision is therefore a
223
valuable device for constraining “self-serving auto-interpretation” —
thereby discouraging free riding and clearly defining what counts as
cooperative behavior. The precise delineation of proscribed behavior
can also help maximize the reputational effects of compliance and
noncompliance. That is, reducing potential interpretive disputes over
whether a state has fulfilled its obligations makes more certain the
reputational costs of human rights violations (which may in turn
translate into material costs).224 Moreover, if “reputational effects of a
violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to international
225
law” —that is, if violations of a human rights treaty can damage a
state’s overall reputation as a treaty partner—then human rights
regimes can piggyback on issue areas in which states value their
reputations more highly.226 Finally, because precision raises the costs
of defection, it enhances the ability of regime participants to gauge
the credibility of commitments; the act of ratifying a treaty with high

223. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 427.
224. See Abbott & Guzman, supra note 6, at 1863:
The clarity of both the international obligation and its violation are important
because a failure to live up to an international obligation triggers a reputational loss.
The reputational consequences are most severe when the obligation is clear and the
violation is unambiguous. As the uncertainty of an obligation increases, the
reputational cost from a violation decreases.
Recall that the coercion model incorporates reputation effects only insofar as they implicate
directly some material cost or benefit. See supra Part I.C.3 (distinguishing acculturation and
coercion in regard to social sanctions and rewards).
225. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 427; see id. (“When a commitment is cast as hard
law, the reputational effects of a violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to
international law, that is, to most international agreements.”); KEOHANE, supra note 28, at 106:
For reasons of reputation, as well as fear of retaliation and concerns about the effects
of precedents, egoistic governments may follow the rules and principles of
international regimes even when myopic self-interest counsels them not to. . . . They
might often decide, in light of this cost-benefit calculation, to conform to the rules.
But see George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S95–S96 (2002) (disputing the influence of the reputational effects of
noncompliance across regimes); Weisburd, supra note 31, at 104 (“[A] state’s breaches of
human rights treaties may be seen as not indicating the likelihood of the state’s breaching other
types of agreements and may not impact on the state’s reputation for reliability regarding such
agreements.”).
226. See Guzman, supra note 6, at 1879–81 (discussing a state’s impact of reputational loss
on capacity to extract concessions in negotiating future agreements).
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levels of precision signals a willingness and capacity to make the
227
grade.
Under the coercion approach, the most important cost of
precision is its effect on treaty negotiations. Commentators suggest
that ambiguity facilitates agreement in the drafting stage. Indeed,
Professors Abbott and Snidal contend that ambiguity can be a “major
advantage”228 in lowering contracting costs and that, in some
circumstances, insisting on precision “may prevent agreement
229
altogether.” The important point is that states will find it easier to
build consensus at a higher level of abstraction.
B. Persuasion
The persuasion approach generally favors greater precision in
the definition of legal obligations. Commentators relying on this
mechanism often acknowledge, however, that imprecision may be
230
necessary in the drafting and ratification processes. Nevertheless,
these commentators argue that regime participants should endeavor
to “concretize” treaty terms over time on the view that specificity
facilitates persuasive interactions and norm internalization.231 These
calls for evolutionary precision are typically tethered to
recommendations concerning how best to design dispute resolution
mechanisms—and, at times, are directed not to treaty makers but to
actors and institutions created by the treaty (such as the independent
experts serving on so-called treaty bodies).232 Because these proposals
are so closely integrated with implementation strategies, we analyze
them more fully in our discussion of enforcement in Part IV.

227. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 427 (stating that “[p]recision of individual
commitments” is one way to enhance credibility and “increase[ ] the costs of reneging” on such
commitments).
228. Id. at 434; id. at 436 (“In general, we hypothesize that softer forms of legalization will
be more attractive to states as contracting costs increase.”).
229. Id. at 445.
230. See, e.g., id. (“Rather than hold up the overall agreement, states can incorporate
hortatory or imprecise provisions to deal with the difficult issues, allowing them to proceed with
the rest of the bargain.”).
231. Cf. id. (“Over time, if the soft arrangements are successful and without adverse
consequences, the initially reluctant states may accept harder legalization.”).
232. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 314–18 (observing that supranational
courts such as the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have
incrementally expanded the application of the treaties under which they were created).
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The important point for now is that persuasion-centered
approaches emphasize the value of precision. For example, Professors
Chayes and Chayes argue that extensive noncompliance stems from
imprecision in how obligations are framed: “[A]mbiguity and
indeterminacy of treaty language,” they contend, “lie at the root of
much of the behavior that may seem to violate treaty
233
requirements.” Under the persuasion approach, rules are most
useful if they sharply reduce uncertainty about the content of
obligations. In general, precise rules help clarify points of agreement
and disagreement. This clarification facilitates targeted debates in
which preexisting, even if thin, agreement on clearly defined
obligations provides a normative framework within which the parties
might move toward further agreement on more controversial matters.
Recall that the touchstone of persuasion is that states internalize
human rights norms following an active assessment of the
justifications for these norms.234 On this view, it is the content of the
rule that is assessed and, ideally, internalized. In this sense, the
precision of legal obligations is central to the project of persuasion. In
comparison, the acculturation approach tolerates greater disparity
between acceptance of rules and actual practice. Under certain
conditions states will accede to obligations to avoid social ostracism
or to conform to orthodoxy—states might accept and (under some
conditions) apply even imprecisely framed treaty obligations.
More specifically, framing strategies analogize controversial
practices to one or more clearly prohibited practices. This reasoning
by analogy carries persuasive force only if the “frame” itself is well
defined. Similarly, the strategy of cuing actors to think harder about
controversial practices relies upon the precision of some underlying
obligations. Recall that this tactic works because the persuadee is
forced to confront and reconcile inconsistencies in stated positions.235
This strategy is unlikely to prompt the persuadee to reevaluate
controversial practices if inconsistencies are easily resolved because
the underlying norms are highly malleable and easily subject to
reinterpretation.
233. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 10; id. at 126–27 (explaining that “parties can
more readily adapt their conduct” to the substantive norms of an international organization
when those norms are made more precise); cf. Raustiala, supra note 7, at 78
(“Managerialism . . . argues that the primary drivers of non-compliance are actually rule
ambiguity and, especially, lack of domestic regulatory capacity.”).
234. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text.
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It is useful at this point to elaborate on the intraregime contexts
in which persuasive encounters might take place. First, the very
exercise of drafting a legal instrument (such as a treaty, resolution, or
declaration) provides an important opportunity for persuasive
encounters. In the course of drafting text, debates over the specific
definition of legal obligations are productive. Many commentators
underscore the importance of these occasions as opportunities to
enunciate norms: “They [substantive norms] are elaborated and given
more concrete and specific form so that parties can more readily
236
adapt their conduct.” In short, as with the membership procedures
discussed in Part II, a seemingly arduous negotiation process—
understood in the coercion model in terms of transaction costs—is
understood as a benefit in the persuasion model. The process affords
valuable opportunities for discourse and exchange.237
Second, persuasive encounters occur in the course of applying
rules to specific practices once a regime is established. The existence
of many structural opportunities for such encounters suggests that ex
ante precision is less important than one might otherwise suppose.
That is, states can draft imprecise rules and defer the process of
specification to subsequent, intraregime encounters. This deferral
typically involves delegation of interpretive authority to a dispute
resolution or supervisory body established by the relevant treaty.
Professors Abbott and Snidal explain that “[d]elegation is often the
best way to deal with incomplete contracting problems,” because
states can “utilize administrative . . . institutions to interpret and
extend broad legal principles.”238 The mechanics of persuasion suggest
some nontrivial virtues of deferral. Most importantly, deferral can
provide structural opportunities for reflection, application,
justification, and argument. “The discursive elaboration and
application of treaty norms is the heart of the compliance process . . . .
In the course of . . . debate, the performance required of a party in a
particular case is progressively defined and specified.”239 That is,
broad standards can furnish a general template against which
“seemingly endless discussion of the scope and meaning of norms”

236. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 126.
237. See id. at 123 (“The participants seek, almost in Socratic fashion, to persuade each
other of the validity of the successive steps in the dialectic.”).
238. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 433.
239. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 123.
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can take place—an important, even if counterintuitive, benefit.
Perhaps most significantly, enmeshing rights-violating states in active
interpretation and justification should facilitate the effectiveness of
persuasion.241
C. Acculturation
The acculturation model departs significantly from canonical
approaches to the “level of precision” problem. International
instruments are often “remarkably precise and dense, presumably
because proponents believe that these characteristics enhance their
normative and political value.”242 The other two behavioral models
are consistent with this line of thinking. Under the coercion and
persuasion approaches, obtaining precision is generally considered
essential to the long-term effectiveness of the regime. For these
approaches, the major cost of precision is that it complicates ex ante
negotiations by making it more difficult to obtain initial commitments
from illiberal (or weakly liberal) states.243 In short, precision (1)
increases the difficulty of reaching agreement ex ante but also (2)
promotes compliance ex post. Under the acculturation approach,
however, these effects are potentially reversed: precision that
outstrips existing preferences might propel agreement, and
imprecision will sometimes help to produce behavioral conformity. In
other words, precision is potentially beneficial ex ante and costly ex
post.

240. Id. at 126; see id. (“[T]he seemingly endless discussion of the scope and meaning of
norms in the formal proceedings of the organization enhances their authoritative[ness] . . . .
[T]he content of the substantive norms becomes more transparent.”).
241. See id. (“It becomes harder for a party to reject the normative command after treating
it seriously and at length in debate within the organization.”); Risse, supra note 33, at 16
(suggesting that governments first become entangled in arguments and then become persuaded
by the logic of those arguments); cf. STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT
ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 102–03, 113 (2001) (documenting that states employ shifting
strategy of silence, denial, and partial acknowledgement when accused of violating accepted
rules).
242. Abbott et al., supra note 214, at 414; see also FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 7, at 30–31 (“Rules which have a readily accessible meaning and which say
what they expect of those who are addressed are more likely to have a real impact on
conduct.”).
243. The effects of complicating negotiations might also yield important benefits such as
fostering deliberation or conveying information. Nevertheless, the inability to reach agreement
in negotiations, or to bring illiberal states on board, is part of the cost of obtaining those
benefits.
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We should say more about both the ex ante and the ex post
effects. First, the acculturation approach suggests that precision will
have less dramatic ex ante effects on treaty negotiations than either
coercion or persuasion suggest. One might assume that establishing
precise yet meaningful human rights obligations would require widely
shared normative and political preferences across states. The
existence of diverse cultures, national histories, and material
resources may be thought to confound efforts to fashion global
agreement in defining obligations. Indeed, some commentators even
contend that cross-national diversity renders customary international
law chimerical: “With over 180 nations representing an even larger
number of cultures, international society lacks a reservoir of shared
values or a common ideology from which to derive and perceive
norms. Shared values and perceptions are essential to the formation
of customary norms . . . .”244 As an empirical matter, however,
remarkable levels of homogeneity exist across all states.
Transnational convergence is apparent in wide-ranging areas such as
education policy, science bureaucracies, development agendas, and
environmental regulation.245 As we argue elsewhere, the patterns of
policy convergence suggest the existence of a global culture (or
246
“world polity”). This global cultural system indicates that some
measure of precision is achievable, especially in areas related to
globally shared norms. These convergent tendencies in policy and
structure also indicate that treaty negotiators and nongovernmental
organizations can efficiently demand greater levels of precision than
persistent cross-national variations might suggest possible. Indeed,
laggard states can be expected to accept particular policy or structural
commitments earlier than their existing set of preferences might
predict. Hence, demanding greater levels of precision in the
legislative process could create opportunities for accelerating
agreement.
The second point—that imprecision promotes behavioral
conformity ex post—requires an important qualification. Here, it is
necessary to distinguish the two types of acculturation discussed
244. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449,
465 (2000).
245. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1759–61 (suggesting global institutionalization
of policies in a wide variety of areas); supra Part I.C.4. (proffering that studies demonstrate that
states emulate standardized models of structural organization and public policy goals).
246. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1757, 1767 (inferring the existence of global
culture from “high levels of organizational isomorphism”).
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earlier: conformity resulting from cognitive cues and conformity
247
resulting from social sanctions. Both types of acculturation predict
some measure of conformity (and other group-regarding behavior).
As discussed previously, behavioral regularities do not issue from the
content of the relevant rule or norm; rather, they are a function of the
248
relations between individual actors and some reference group(s).
Conformity depends less on the properties of the rule than on the
properties of the actor’s relationship to the community. Because the
convention or norm is associated in general terms with the identity of
the group, rules best foster conformity by “establish[ing] broad
hortatory goals with few specific proscribed or prescribed
activities.”249 This effect suggests that imprecision mobilizes “cognitive
pressures” to adopt social norms (the first type of acculturation).
Precision, on the other hand, is more likely to emphasize
disagreements—triggering cognitive cues that the would-be reference
group is importantly dissimilar from the target actor.250 There are,
nevertheless, good reasons to suspect that precision might facilitate
social rewards and sanctions—one of the two types of acculturation
that we identify. One problem is that constructivist scholarship on the
subject does not carefully distinguish the two types of acculturation.
Therefore, the utility of precision has been obscured.
251
Professor Thomas Franck’s discussion of “determinacy” helps
explain both the distinction between the two types of acculturation
and the potential benefits to precision. Franck discusses how precise
rules promote compliance—emphasizing the social value of precision.
His analysis of precision, however, generally suggests only one type of
acculturation—the distribution of social sanctions. According to
Franck, precision strengthens the perceived fairness (and legitimacy)
of a rule because “it is thought fairer to impose rights and duties
which can be understood and anticipated by those to whom they are
addressed than to impose rights and duties which leave the reader

247. See supra Part I.C.1. (arguing that acculturation occurs through cognitive and social
pressures).
248. See supra Part I.C.2.
249. Ronald B. Mitchell, International Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Beyond Carrots and
Sticks, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1997, at 40, 46; see also David Strang & John W. Meyer,
Institutional Conditions for Diffusion, 22 THEORY & SOC’Y 487, 493–94 (1993) (describing the
importance of promulgating general conceptions of state obligations).
250. The literature here is substantial. See, e.g., Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9.
251. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7, at 52 (arguing that precise rules are more
likely to affect conduct).
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252
unable to anticipate the vagaries of . . . interpretation.” Target states
are accordingly more likely to accept the social sanction as legitimate,
and other states are more likely to sponsor sanctions. In addition,
Franck suggests that the determinacy of a rule will narrow the range
of permissible interpretations and thus facilitate the regulatory effects
of social sanctions. He contends that states, in trying to avoid the
wrath of the community, will attempt to evade the application of a
rule “by interpreting the rule permissively” and “using clever
sophistry.”253 Precision limits that possibility.
We agree that precision may strengthen social pressure by
enhancing the legitimacy of a sanction. In that respect, an
acculturation approach would value precision. Professor Franck’s
analysis, however, is unsatisfactory because he undervalues (or fails
to consider) the microprocesses of acculturation. Effective social
sanctions (and rewards) require that target actors value the judgment
of some reference group. Indeed, it is the approval of, or status in,
this reference group that the target actor seeks. If precision outstrips
the institutionalized preferences and expectations of target actors,
then it disserves acculturation. As described above, too much
254
precision risks deinstitutionalization.
Moreover, Professor Franck’s concern with self-serving and
evasive interpretations does not easily fit the conceptual apparatus of
acculturation through cognitive processes. Indeed, cognitive pressures
suggest that states may be more inclined to conform their behavior to
community expectations—and that they are unlikely to sustain, over
the long term, an idiosyncratic interpretation of any norm that the
international community considers central. The motivation to mimic
the reference group is also self-directed. Indeed, states will even
adopt legitimated practices under conditions of little or no
255
surveillance by the international community. On this view, it is

252. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 33.
253. See id. at 31, 33 (arguing that the vagueness of a rule and noncompliance with it vary
proportionately); see also FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7, at 79–80 (positing that “sophist”
rules are more likely to be ignored because their lack of precision renders them difficult to
apply).
254. See, e.g., Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9.
255. See, e.g., Aaron Benavot et al., Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National
Curricula, 1920–1986, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 85, 86, 90–91 (1991) (proposing that similarities among
primary school curricula are linked to the rise of standardized models of society and noting that
the same core subjects have appeared in most official curricula); Finnemore, supra note 188, at
575–76, 581–82, 585–87 (arguing that states created science policy organizations in response to
norms promoted by UNESCO (which redefined science as a state concern), but not because of
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inaccurate to suggest that states embedded in international
organizations will invariably engage in “unilateral, self-serving
256
exculpatory interpretations of . . . rules.” Furthermore, Professor
Franck’s analysis of this issue emphasizes the penalties side of social
pressures, rather than social rewards or cognitive impulses to
conform. In that respect, Professor Franck’s analysis indicates that
precision may be a less valuable tool under conditions in which social
sanctions are underutilized, infeasible, or expensive.

coercion exerted by the organization); Frank et al., supra note 100, at 31–32 (emphasizing that
global models of society—not local or national definitions of society—determine what is
included in universities’ curricula).
256. FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7, at 79; see id. (noting that the elasticity of
“sophist” rules may undermine the legitimacy resulting from such rules).

GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC

686

8/12/2005 10:48 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:621

TABLE 3: PRECISION OF OBLIGATIONS
Precision
1. Ex post: Precision constitutes a
clear yardstick, leaving less room
to deny or contest violations
Coercion

Ambiguity
1. Ex ante: Ambiguity
facilitates agreement

2. Ex post: Precision augments
reputational effects
3. Ex post: Precision creates focal
points
1. Ex ante: The debate over exact
rules is productive
2. Ex ante: Precision leads to high
levels of agreement because debate
changes the minds of relevant
actors

Persuasion

3. Ex post: Imprecision engenders
a lower degree of compliance
because terms must be sufficiently
precise to solve specific problems

1. Ex ante: Ambiguity
facilitates agreement
2. Ex post: Ambiguity
generates the opportunity
and need for subsequent
discussions

3. Ex post: The specific
process of applying rules
4. Ex post: Persuasion predicts high to practices propels the
communicative process
levels of compliance because
agreement is genuine and reflects
changed preferences
1. Ex ante: Precision risks
overemphasizing
disagreement, which leads
to deinstitutionalization

Acculturation

1. Ex ante: Acculturation predicts a
2. Ex post: Acculturation
broader zone of potential
predicts a high degree of
agreement because of social
compliance despite
pressures
ambiguity because states
2. Ex ante: Acculturation predicts a are proven to follow
broader zone of potential
general, even unstated,
agreement because of a shared
models
global culture
3. Ex post: It is important
to reach broad consensus
for the institutionalizing
effects
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION: MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT
The final design issue that we examine is how best to monitor
and enforce compliance with substantive regime rules. Admittedly,
other design choices also bear on questions of compliance and
effectiveness. But the devices for monitoring and enforcement
probably have the most direct consequences for the observance of
regime rules. Existing options range from “soft” to “hard”
techniques. We discuss the following points along that spectrum:
1. Publishing Best Practices
Examples include the International Coordinating Committee for
257
National Human Rights Institutions, U.N. Sub-Commission on the
258
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights;

2. Monitoring and Reporting
Examples include the Special Mechanisms under the U.N.
259
Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American Commission of

257. The International Coordinating Committee is an umbrella organization
representing
national-level
human
rights
institutions
(e.g.,
commissions
and
ombudsmen). Along with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee
has developed best practices for national human rights institutions. Documents relating
to best practices for the implementation of human rights regimes and programs are available
at http://www.nhri.net; see also Commonwealth Secretariat, National Human Rights
Institutions: Best Practice (2001) www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/
%7BBF05153F-7565-4A2F-8F2A-F002F05594EC%7D_HumanRightsBestPractice.pdf.
258. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights is the
main subsidiary body of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The Sub-Commission is
comprised of twenty-six independent experts who meet annually to undertake studies and make
recommendations on thematic agenda items. The Sub-Commission has assisted in the
development of best practices in areas such as affirmative action. E.g., The Concept of
Affirmative Action, U.N. ESCOR Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/11 (2000).
259. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights appoints independent individuals
(special rapporteurs) or a group of individuals (a working group) to address specific
country situations (e.g., Burma/Myanmar) or thematic issues (e.g., torture). These
individuals and groups examine, monitor, advise, and publicly report on human rights
situations in specific states and on types of human rights violations across different states.
Links to studies and reports of special rapporteurs and working groups on these topics
can be found at the Commission’s website at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/
liststudrepts.htm.
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260

Human Rights, periodic state reports to international human
261
rights treaty bodies;

3. Criticizing Bad Actors
Examples include the country resolutions by the U.N. Commission
262
on Human Rights,
concluding observations by international
263
human rights treaty bodies on state periodic reports;

4. Binding Decisions and Material Sanctions
264

Examples include the European Court of Human Rights,
265
International Criminal Court.

Scholars also offer variations on existing structures. Professor
Laurence Helfer and Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example,
propose institutional changes to make treaty bodies appear and act
260. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is a permanent organ of the
Organization of American States. The mandate of the Commission includes conducting on-site
visits to investigate specific situations and publishing special reports regarding human rights
conditions in particular states. For individual country reports, see the Commission’s website at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/publi.eng.htm.
261. The six principal human rights treaties each require state parties to submit a period
report to a supervisory organ, called a “treaty body,” which reviews the state’s compliance with
the treaty obligations. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
138, art. 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181–82 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized
herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights . . . .”); see also supra note 138
(listing the six treaties).
262. See supra note 139 (describing the Commission on Human Rights). The Commission on
Human Rights is empowered to adopt resolutions criticizing a U.N. member state in “situations
which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights.” E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N.
ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, 1479th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc E/4393 (1967).
263. The concluding observations of a treaty body provide a collective assessment of a
state’s periodic report. Concluding observations commonly include a declaration of factors
impeding the application of the treaty and criticism of specific practices. For example,
concluding observations from reports by the Committee against Torture are available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ menu2/6/cat/cats.htm. For additional background information on
and links to treaty monitoring bodies, reports, and reporting requirements, see Amnesty
International’s website at http://web.amnesty.org/ pages/treaty-periodic-reports-eng.
264. Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are binding. Responsibility for
supervising the execution of judgments lies with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, supra
note 172, art. 46 (requiring states parties to abide by judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights and empowering the Committee of Ministers to enforce such judgments).
265. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 77, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
3, 135 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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266
more like courts. Dean Harold Koh emphasizes the importance of
increasing transnational adjudication.267 Professors Jack Goldsmith
and Stephen Krasner both stress that economic and military force
268
would best promote human rights, and they question whether new
institutions (the International Criminal Court) and new doctrines
(humanitarian intervention) support or undermine the maximum use
of that power.269 Notably, these projects share the sense that the
monitoring and enforcement options listed above reflect a continuum
of effectiveness. Such proposals reflect the view that compliance is
best induced by the exercise of coercive authority—such as military
intervention or binding decisions of third-party monitoring
institutions. This view, we maintain, is called into question by the
acculturation approach. Indeed, we posit that, under certain
conditions, “soft law” mechanisms will be more effective in
establishing durable norms.
In examining this set of design issues, it is important to isolate
the effects suggested by each of the three mechanisms of social
influence. One might mistakenly suppose that exploiting a range of
tactics—without having to delve into finer details of mechanisms and
behavioral logics—is a pragmatically sound approach. This response,
however, is riddled with problems. First, and perhaps most obviously,
effective regime design often requires setting priorities and making
tough choices with limited resources. Accordingly, enforcement
decisions should be based on a comparison of the expected utility of
each option, as measured by the probability of achieving behavioral

266. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 366 (suggesting that the U.N. Human Rights
Committee take additional steps to reinforce those characteristics that tend to make it more like
a tribunal).
267. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(1991); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203
(1996) (suggesting that interaction between states and the transnational legal process
encourages compliance with international law).
268. Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 970–72 (summarizing Professor Krasner’s argument that
“power” and self-interest account for states’ adherence to international norms); Krasner, supra
note 31, at 139–40, 166–67 (suggesting and then concluding that “realism”—via the use of
military power—is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, to ensure enforcement of human
rights regimes).
269. See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 89, 89 (2003) (asserting that the “ICC depends on U.S. . . . military . . . and economic
support for its success”); Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 56–57 (arguing that the ICC cannot fulfill its goals without U.S.
military support and that the ICC may in fact increase impunity for human rights violations by
decreasing the likelihood of such military support to punish noncompliance).
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270
change. Second, the features of the three mechanisms reveal
potential incompatibilities among strategies. For example, as we
discuss below, some forms of coercion would undercut strategies for
fostering acculturation; that is, coercive tactics can have a
deinstitutionalizing effect. Some of these conflicts can be managed,
whereas others are more fundamental. Third, the central practical
concerns of specific strategic options vary by social logic. For
example, the persuasion approach is most concerned about
“overlegalization” by third-party monitoring institutions.271 Other
concerns that vary by behavioral logic include the informational
politics employed by various strategies—such as the type and timing
of disclosures.272 In short, sensible regime design must carefully
consider the three social mechanisms when fashioning
implementation strategies.273

A. Coercion
Under the coercion approach, traditional notions of power—
military and economic—provide the principal machinery for changing
state practices. Treaty regimes discourage undesirable behavior by
increasing its costs (or, alternatively, encourage desirable behavior by

270. Studying mechanisms of social influence may also help assess the likelihood that states
will resort to one strategy or another. For example, Professors Chayes and Chayes reject several
coercive strategies not because the respective approach would be ineffective if deployed but
because they conclude that the prospects of states using such an approach are dim. See CHAYES
& CHAYES, supra note 7, at 63–66 (criticizing international economic sanctions for being
ineffective because consensus is difficult to assemble and maintain, sanctions are slow to
operate, and enforcement decisions are essentially made on a national level).
271. Cf. Helfer, supra note 4, at 1855–58 (suggesting that overlegalization by way of highly
effective enforcement mechanisms may lead to a backlash against human rights treaties,
including withdrawal).
272. See Mitchell, supra note 249, at 48–49 (summarizing the transparency requirements of
various nonproliferation strategies).
273. Understanding the impact of the different logics can also help identify important,
incidental social effects of a design choice. For example, coercive devices—such as binding
decisions by supranational institutions—may most effectively produce social change through
their noncoercive effects (such as helping to frame issues). Evaluating their utility should thus
take into account predicted outcomes—not simply express objectives such as deterrence and
raising costs of proscribed behavior. This lens reveals how NGO strategies that may appear
naive—such as constructing tribunals to deter tyrants or advocating that regime principles apply
equally to powerful liberal states—could reflect more sophisticated understandings of symbolic
politics than critics recognize. See Goldsmith, supra note 269, at 90, 95 (criticizing NGO’s stated
goal in creating the ICC and arguing that the ICC will reduce human rights protections);
Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 269, at 53 (criticizing the political platforms of human rights
NGOs with respect to constructing international criminal tribunals).
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rewarding its practice). On this view, the best prospects for
orchestrating change include establishing “agreements with teeth”
274
(e.g., the International Criminal Court via criminal sanctions or the
U.N. Charter via Security Council enforcement measures275) and
arrangements that link human rights performance to financial and
276
military interests (e.g., conditional U.S. security assistance or good
governance requirements for World Bank loans277).
The coercion approach does not value highly soft strategies such
as publishing best practices or monitoring and reporting human rights
abuses—except insofar as these strategies are integrated into some
coercive apparatus. Publishing best practices, for example, might
serve to establish standards of conduct around which coercive
measures can be organized—in other words, these focal points might
help regime participants identify good and bad actors. However,
utilizing best practices in this manner probably contradicts the
278
informal character of their promulgation and ignores the fact that
279
they represent a prospective ideal. Indeed, tying best practices to
coercive strategies would frustrate the relaxed political process
through which organizations generally draft, endorse, and promote
such standards. Monitoring and reporting are also considered
274. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 265, arts. 103–111,
2187 U.N.T.S. at 150–53 (detailing enforcement mechanisms for criminal sentences, specifically
the relationship between the ICC and the states parties to enforce such sentences).
275. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–51 (detailing enforcement actions that the Security Council can
take to maintain peace and security or to respond to acts of aggression).
276. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (2000) (prohibiting
security assistance for any country whose government consistently violates internationally
recognized human rights).
277. See World Bank Group, Governance & Anti-Corruption: About Governance, at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/about.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (providing general information about the World Bank’s strategy and
approach to promoting good governance in client countries).
278. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has sometimes assumed
responsibility for compiling and publishing best practices in the human rights field. The Office
of the U.N. Secretary-General has undertaken similar initiatives, as has the Sub-Commission on
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. Each of these bodies is comprised of U.N.
administrative officials or independent experts, not states. These institutions accordingly lend
themselves to informal, less politicized processes. See, e.g., supra notes 257–58 (providing links
to best practices information).
279. Cf. Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: The
Sullivan and MacBride Principles, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NONBINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 418, 422 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000)
(suggesting that political principles can only operate effectively if the legal system provides
them with “breathing room” in which to operate, and implying that excessive determinacy and
enforcement would likely backfire).
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valuable—if connected to coercive tools. They might generate
information according to which rewards and penalties could be
directed. Linking information about state practices to coercive tactics,
280
however, can also force information underground. Indeed, coercive
strategies might provide states with incentives to conceal the very
types of information most useful to the persuasion or acculturation
approach.
The coercion approach also considers official criticism to be
largely unimportant. As a direct coercive technique, criticism
constitutes a nominal sanction. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of
the net benefit of criticism alone once transaction costs are taken into
account. Nevertheless, depending on the nature of the institutions
responsible for levying criticism, the practice may help to delineate
proscribed behavior. For example, Professors Abbott and Snidal
explain that states may promulgate relatively general directives in
response to ex ante contracting costs and thus may designate
281
institutions to elaborate more specific rules. The creation of a
formal body to criticize state performance—and thereby apply legal
obligations to practice—can serve this process of elaboration.
Additionally, graduated criticism might convey useful information to
a targeted state to facilitate reorientation of its practices. Specifically,
graduated criticism might signal the existence of a political
commitment to employ coercive power.282 Of course, this suggests that
official criticism should be used judiciously to maintain the credibility
of threats over time. This understanding of official criticism is
inconsistent with tactics of persuasion and acculturation, which rely
on more liberal or sweeping use of criticism (for example, to bring
attention to events or to facilitate the process of institutionalizing
norms).

280. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 41–42.
281. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 433–34 (“Delegation is often the best way to
deal with incomplete contracting problems.”).
282. As an illustration, the U.N. Security Council has adopted a routine of using deliberately
graduated language in a series of resolutions, before activating its more powerful enforcement
authority.
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B. Persuasion
283
Under the persuasion approach, “managerialism” is the central
medium for promoting regime objectives. Managerialism suggests
that human rights regimes can encourage desirable behavior in two
ways: (1) by systematically engaging governments in discussion about
controversial practices and (2) by fostering structural opportunities
for transnational networks to engage governments (or other relevant
284
audiences). On this view, states can be convinced to embrace regime
norms (1) through organizational arrangements that facilitate
meaningful communicative exchanges among stakeholders (e.g., the
International Labor Organization285) and (2) through the exercise of
“good offices” by high-level officials (e.g., the High Commissioner on
National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe286).
Furthermore, according to the persuasion approach, monitoring
and reporting can induce change if conducted in a sensitive manner.
Some persuasion scholars recommend these strategies as means of
generating useful information and cooperative solutions. Professors
Chayes and Chayes, for example, discuss the usefulness of directing
states’ attention to potential defections to facilitate management of

283. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 542 (“The theory was ‘managerial’ in that it
rejected sanctions and other ‘hard’ forms of enforcement in favor of collective management of
(non)performance.”); id. at 542–43 (describing principles of managerialism).
284. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 126–27 (stating that “endless discussion
of . . . norms . . . enhances their authoritative character”); Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2,
at 543 (discussing prescriptive strategies for managing noncompliance in accordance with this
theoretical approach).
285. The International Labor Organisation (ILO) is structured on a tripartite system; each
country is represented by delegations from government, labor, and business. The members meet
regularly to devise policy recommendations, develop standards, and discuss implementation.
ILO, Structure of the ILO, at http://www.ilo.org/public/English/depts./fact.htm (last updated
Sept. 26, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
286. Ratner, supra note 74, at 595 (arguing that the High Commissioner on National
Minorities exemplifies “an innovative instrument for persuading relevant domestic decisionmakers to comply through a set of distinct . . . strategies,” and stating that “[t]hese . . .aspects of
the European experience represent a direct challenge to existing theories on compliance with
international law”); id. at 695 (“The work of the High Commissioner shows the salience of
softer forms of law not merely as pieces of paper, but as tools of persuasion.”); see also Harold
Hongju Koh, A Job Description for The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 35
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493, 500–01 (2004) (arguing “that the Commissioner is best able to
draw attention to economic, social, and cultural rights” when these rights are denied to
minorities).
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287
such defections. The significance of periodic state reports can help
states and other interested actors to assess actual practices under the
terms of the treaty. The open exchange of ideas and experiences
assists “the winnowing out of reasonably justifiable or unintended
failures to fulfill commitments . . . and the identification and isolation
of the few cases of egregious and willful violation.”288 Monitoring and
reporting can also serve an important function in cuing states to think
harder about human rights violations—another valuable ingredient in
the persuasion process.289 Accordingly, international organizations
could create institutional environments in which new information
(e.g., about the type or prevalence of human rights violations) would
be routinely and systematically linked to broadly established values.
In contrast, a second variant of the persuasion scholarship suggests
that regimes do not have to emphasize exposing state practices.
External surveillance is considered less important because the
dominant social influence is based on sincere acceptance of the
content of the rules.290 Nevertheless, disclosures that reveal new types
and patterns of violations are independently important in that they
change minds about the significance and prevalence of human rights
violations.291 These views, in turn, help mobilize (and organize)
responses at a systemic level. And finally, as we discussed above,
some of this scholarship recommends strategies not clearly linked to
the persuasion-centered causal account—indeed, they seem to rely on
coercion or acculturation processes. For example, some
commentators suggest that social sanctions will gradually compel
states to narrow the gap between position-taking and actual
practice.292

287. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 126–27 (asserting that the process of
evaluating alleged noncompliance clarifies norms and defines the performance required to bring
a state party into compliance).
288. Id. at 28.
289. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text (discussing cuing as a persuasion
technique).
290. In discussing this regulatory strategy in the nuclear proliferation context, Professor
Ronald Mitchell explains: “Monitoring potential proliferant behavior becomes unnecessary
since actors serve as ‘their own ubiquitous inspectors.’” Mitchell, supra note 249, at 45 (quoting
EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 248 (1982)).
291. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 16 (describing transnational networks’
strategy of using information to shame state actors and to raise awareness of human rights
violations).
292. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 123 (“The participants seek . . . to persuade
each other . . . . Since the party has participated in each stage of the argument, the pressures to
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Less clear in the persuasion model is the effectiveness of criticism
and sanctions. The literature is ambivalent on this issue. One school
of thought maintains that criticism and more severe penalties can
complement efforts at persuasion. Indeed, the (implicit or explicit)
293
threat of sanctions may bring states to the table in the first place.
Moreover, some scholarship stresses the importance of persuasion
but finds its greatest impact in encouraging transnational political
movements and foreign states to leverage concessions from
294
recalcitrant states. In sharp contrast, other scholarship argues that
criticism and more severe penalties have a deleterious effect on the
communicative atmosphere required for collective deliberation to
thrive.295 Criticism may, therefore, also discourage states from
systematically reviewing new types and patterns of human rights
violations.296
C. Acculturation
Under the acculturation approach, power is understood as
productive, cultural, and diffuse—not merely prohibitory, material,
and centralized. Treaty regimes can induce desirable behavior
through processes that institutionalize models of legitimate state
practice and that link states and their citizenry to forums that
conform to the final judgment are great.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 119 (“Failure to
behave in ways for which one can construct acceptable accounts leads to varying degrees of
censure . . . . It is . . . crucial that international relations are conducted in large part through
diplomatic conversation—explanation and justification, persuasion and dissuasion, approval and
condemnation.”).
293. See id. at 26, 28 (suggesting that “justificatory discourse” and “[t]he need to be a
member in good standing” of the international community exert strong pressure on states to
comply with human rights obligations).
294. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 12, 16, 117; see also supra text accompanying
notes 18–22 (citing scholarship suggesting that activist networks use human rights norms to
convince audiences to encourage their governments to persuade nonconforming states to
comply with such norms). In terms of framing effects in particular (and thus within the strict
terms of the persuasion model), criticism of a state’s behavior can also increase the salience of
an issue.
295. Notably, scholars who derive their models of communicative action from Jürgen
Habermas stress the purity of discourse free of coercive techniques. See, e.g., Payne, supra note
7, at 41–42 (agreeing with the argument that exacting concessions through material exchanges
(bribes) is not free of distortion and that such bribes prevent the development of shared
normative values).
296. Cf. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 44 (1997) (arguing that
international environmental agreements can hasten progressive implementation of norms by
avoiding the use of words such as “dispute” or “compliance”).
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elaborate and apply such standards. Furthermore, the theory of
acculturation suggests that regimes should carry out a number of
activities: allocate available resources to assist states in reporting on
their own human rights practices (e.g., under Article 40 of the
297
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ), facilitate
transnational experts in human rights consultancy (e.g., the technical
and advisory services of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights298), and create local “receptor sites” for transmitting
global norms (e.g., by establishing and strengthening national human
299
rights commissions).
Acculturation values the publication of best practices more
highly than does either of the other mechanisms. Admittedly, the
general approach would not suggest relying heavily on this method.
Nevertheless, publishing best practices can contribute to the process
of standardization. States may be more willing to adopt such models,
at faster rates and more durably, than the other approaches suggest.
The emulation of best practices will not require persuading relevant
actors. State policies that “mimic” best practices should also be more
durable than policy shifts caused by coercion—the policies should
generally persist even when material pressure is no longer applied or
available.
Monitoring and reporting can also perform valuable functions in
a regime that takes acculturation seriously. However, these devices
should be used differently depending on the form of acculturation
300
being harnessed. With respect to conformity through social rewards
and sanctions, it is vital to expose wrongdoing (and to tie exposure to
external praise and criticism). Accordingly, external surveillance and
reporting—especially by third-party states and organizations—should
be significant parts of the monitoring and reporting apparatus.301

297.
298.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 138, art. 40.
See U.N. OFFICE OF HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS., FACT SHEET NO. 3,
ADVISORY SERVICES AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1996) (describing the history, current status, and scope of providing advisory services to states
parties and NGOs to help member countries implement human rights treaties and other related
obligations), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs3.htm.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10 and accompanying text (citing acculturation
scholarship suggesting that national human rights commissions serve to accelerate diffusion of
norms).
300. See supra Part I.C.1 (describing the two microprocesses of acculturation: social pressure
and cognitive pressure).
301. Cf. ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 85–86 (2002) (describing the effectiveness of U.S. State Department reports on human
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With respect to acculturation through cognitive pressure,
monitoring and reporting serve different functions. States will
formally adopt particular conventions even under conditions of
nonsurveillance. That is, they will accede to particular norms in the
process of identity formation and mimicry of globally promulgated
models. External monitoring and reporting are thus not necessarily
required (a fact that human rights regimes should take into account
when considering how to expend limited resources). Nevertheless,
visibility might perform a regulatory function. Indeed, the leading
social theorist on discursive practices, Michel Foucault, emphasizes
the power of visibility in regulating social behavior.302 A regime
attempting to exploit these attributes might stress reporting by a
state’s own organs, not simply reporting by third parties. Indeed, the
very process of identifying, describing, and controlling human rights
practices helps the diffusion of the human rights discourse through
global and local levels. This general approach, however, would
require care not to institutionalize noncompliance. As suggested by
recent studies of domestic order maintenance,303 international regimes
should be concerned that emphasizing the prevalence of violations
might promote disorder and further violations.304

rights practices of other countries); KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 23 (“Moral leverage
involves what some commentators have called the ‘mobilization of shame,’ where the behavior
of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny . . . . on the assumption that
governments value the good opinion of others . . . .”).
302. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, Questions on
Geography, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977, at 63, 72 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (emphasizing that
surveillance is one way that states and individuals can monitor each other); James F. Keeley,
Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes, 44 INT’L ORG. 83, 92 (1990) (briefly
explaining how “actors are defined and become visible as targets of observation and control”);
cf. Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social
Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 687–89 (2001) (explaining Foucault’s analysis of visibility—i.e.,
exposure via surveillance—in constructing norms and inducing behavioral regularity).
303. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996) (citing the
“Broken Windows” study, which indicates a correlation between publicly visible disorder and
more serious crimes); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 366, 369–70 (1997) (supporting the “Broken Windows” theory that public disorder
lowers the “price” of serious crime).
304. More theoretical work could examine how these concerns might relate to Foucault’s
notion of “incitement to discourse”—a social process in which classification and prohibition
help produce perversions. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 17–
35 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978).
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Under certain conditions, binding third-party decisions and
material sanctions may weaken the effectiveness of acculturation.
Cognitive dissonance studies suggest that the simultaneous presence
of instrumental threats and promises can undermine subtle forms of
305
socialization. Actors are more willing to embrace a practice or idea
if they consider the decision to comply an act of personal choice
(intrinsic motivation), rather than one compelled by external force
(extrinsic motivation). However, the applicability of this theory to
states (either at the macrolevel of states or the microlevel of
diplomats, elites, or domestic publics) is questionable. Additionally,
once norms are internalized, more intrusive (and perhaps coercive)
measures might then be legitimated (e.g., the European Court of
Human Rights306).

305. See, e.g., Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, Rethinking the Value of Choice: A
Cultural Perspective on Intrinsic Motivation, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 349, 364 (1999)
(reporting results of studies indicating that theories and paradigms of motivation reflect the
cultures in which they are developed); cf. Mark R. Lepper, Social-Control Processes and the
Internalization of Social Values: An Attributional Perspective, in SOCIAL COGNITION AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 294, 318 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1983) (suggesting that systems of
rewards and punishments will be used in different contexts).
306. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 314–17 (discussing the importance of
incrementalism in the evolution of European Community law and European human rights law).
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TABLE 4: MECHANISMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Publishing
Best
Practices

Coercion

Negligible

Monitoring and
Reporting

Criticizing Bad
Actors

Effective (in
providing
Negligible
information) if tied
to coercion

One View: Highly
effective: Monitoring and reporting
devices generate
issue salience (e.g.,
they change minds
Moderately regarding the
Persuasion
gravity of a
effective
problem)
Another View:
Moderately
important if the
states already
agree on a rule

Binding Decisions and
Sanctions

Highly effective and
essential

Potentially
effective: Criticism Potentially counterproductive: Sanctions
generates issue
create incentives not to
salience
reveal information
Potentially
counterproductive: Risk: “Overlegalization”
Criticism has a
(third-party adjudicator
deleterious impact exceeds states’ accepon the communic- tance of obligation)
ative atmosphere

Potentially counterproductive: Sanctions
create incentives not to
reveal information
Potentially productive if
there are high levels of
institutionalization
Highly effective
and important
Acculturation

Effective

Highly effective
and important:
Risk: Emphasizing Criticism mobilizes
prevalence risks
shame
institutionalizing
noncompliance

Risk: Sanctions can
undermine institutionalization (i.e., when
cognitive dissonance
exists, coercive force can
actually undermine
acceptance)
Risk: Coercion
administered inequitably
(e.g., by imposing double
standards or by shielding
some states from
sanctions) undercuts
social influence
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V. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL
In this Article, our principal objectives are to analyze the
characteristics of each mechanism of social influence and to
demonstrate their significance for institutional design, in the hope of
assisting future research agendas in international legal scholarship—
empirical, conceptual, and doctrinal. Having now analyzed the
microprocesses that comprise each mechanism, we offer some
provisional comments about the prospects for developing an
empirically grounded approach that would integrate all three
mechanisms in fashioning a human rights regime. Such an approach—
which would appreciate the distinct qualities of, and interactions
among, the processes of coercion, persuasion, and acculturation—is in
our view essential to building an effective human rights regime. In
this Part, we identify some general features that such a model should
include.
First, an integrated model should take seriously the processes of
acculturation. Indeed, acculturation has been systematically
undervalued (and, at times, misunderstood) in debates about human
rights regimes. As discussed above,307 commentators rarely invoke
acculturation; when they do, it is often either (1) conflated with
persuasion or (2) unexplained. Yet, the acculturation approach is
potentially quite useful in the context of human rights law. As we
mention in the Introduction, there are several reasons to suspect that
the other mechanisms will prove ineffective in this arena. States
generally lack sufficient interest or political will to sustain an effective
strategy of coercion. Persuasion approaches require internalization of
the values of human rights regimes—and there is little evidence to
suggest that this is a reliable method of socializing bad actors. Indeed,
theories of persuasion do not provide a useful way to think about
partial or incomplete internalization. In short, the prevailing
approaches will prove ineffective. Furthermore, as the analysis of
membership rules demonstrates, acculturation strategies greatly value
the social effects generated by intergovernmental organizations. In
contrast, both coercion and persuasion operate quite effectively
outside formal organizational settings.
Second, an integrated model should account for negative
interactions among the three mechanisms. Simply put, deploying one

307.

See supra Part I (reviewing mechanisms of social influence, including acculturation).
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mechanism might undermine the ability to deploy another. For
example, overt coercion can interfere with persuasion strategies by
polarizing group deliberations. Coercion may also undercut
acculturation by suggesting that the target behavior is not selfevidently appropriate—the “deinstitutionalization” effect that we
308
Persuasion and acculturation may similarly
describe above.
countermand one another if the former focuses attention on resolving
particular substantive disagreements among states when the latter
stresses abstract commonalities. Persuasion and acculturation
strategies may also conflict when the former highlights the prevalence
of human rights violations as a framing device and the latter, to avoid
the institutionalization of undesirable behavior, casts such violations
as aberrant.
Third, an integrated model should endeavor to identify the
conditions under which the various mechanisms operate successfully.
For example, the effectiveness of all three mechanisms will likely vary
according to the socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions of the
relevant states. In particular, it is important to assess the structural
capacities of states to monitor human rights practices and sanction
human rights violations. The likelihood, feasibility, and costs of these
measures will often determine which strategy (or strategies) should
predominate. Another important variable is the character of the
extant structural relations at the global or regional level. For example,
the effectiveness of various mechanisms should turn on
considerations such as the density of international interactions, the
axes along which relevant states share important cultural
characteristics (including religion, ethnicity, and language), and the
distribution of military and economic power.
Finally, an integrated model should consider various
“sequencing” effects. That is, an integrated model might emphasize
different mechanisms at different stages of the institutionalization of a
norm. For example, there may be reason to coerce states into formal
organizations in which they are later subject to measures that rely on
persuasion or acculturation. If acculturation can alter state
preferences over time, intergovernmental organizations might
incorporate more flexible administrative devices such as

308. See supra text accompanying note 305 (arguing that cognitive dissonance studies
suggest that institutional regimes combining threats and rewards can undermine subtle
socialization techniques); see also Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15
J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 596–606 (2001) (summarizing this growing literature).
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renegotiation clauses—essentially devices that recognize that the
preferences of states may be systematically influenced by their very
participation in an organization. These insights suggest that a human
rights regime might also enhance its effectiveness by demanding
modest initial commitments and ratcheting up obligations over time.
More specifically, strategies could include allowing supervisory
organs to expand their authority incrementally and creating
opportunities for optional protocols only after an organization has
existed for a particular time period. Under certain conditions, a
regime might concentrate on exploiting the effects of acculturation
before investing heavily in persuasive techniques to define obligations
more precisely. Also, human rights regimes can potentially employ
coercive techniques most effectively once robust levels of
internalization have occurred. This strategy of delayed onset coercion
reflects, in many respects, the evolutionary path of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
These reflections on the general contours of an integrated model
are, we recognize, provisional. The full elaboration of an integrated
model will require further empirical and conceptual work.
Nevertheless, we contend that a few basic points should guide this
work. First, the project of building an effective international human
rights regime will be stymied if the microprocesses of social influence
are not taken into account. And, second, considerable attention must
be given to the force of acculturation.
CONCLUSION
Regime design choices turn on empirical claims about how states
behave and under what conditions their behavior changes. We
suggest that a central problem for human rights regimes is how best to
socialize “bad actors” to incorporate globally legitimated models of
state behavior and how to get “good actors” to perform better.
Substantial empirical evidence suggests three distinct mechanisms
whereby states and institutions might influence the behavior of other
states: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. Several structural
impediments preclude full institutionalization of coercion- and
persuasion-based regimes in human rights law. Yet, inexplicably,
these models of behavioral modification predominate in international
legal studies. In this Article, we first unpack the components of each
mechanism. We then link each of the identified mechanisms of social
influence to specific regime design characteristics—identifying several
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ways in which acculturation might occasion a rethinking of
fundamental regime design problems in human rights law. Through a
systematic evaluation of three design problems—conditional
membership, precision of obligations, and enforcement methods—we
identify and elaborate acculturation as a third way to conceive of
regime design problems. We maintain that (1) acculturation is a
conceptually distinct social process through which state behavior is
influenced and (2) the regime design recommendations issuing from
this approach defy conventional wisdom in international human rights
scholarship. This exercise not only recommends reexamination of
policy debates in human rights law, but also provides a conceptual
framework within which the costs and benefits of various design
principles and political strategies might be assessed. Our aim is to
improve the understanding of how norms operate in international
society with a view to improving the capacity of global and domestic
institutions to harness the processes through which human rights
cultures are built. Regime design in human rights law must then seek
to incorporate what is known about global culture, the diffusion of
practices within and across societies, and the processes of social
influence more generally. This Article is, we hope, a step in that
direction.

